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ABSTRACT 
 
TURKEY’S ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION: A TWO-LEVEL 
GAME ANALOGY 
 
ONUR KAYALAR 
M.A. in European Studies Programme, Thesis, 2006 
 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç 
 
Key Words: Liberal Intergovernmentalism, preferences, public opinion, leaders’ 
rhetoric, Turkey’s membership in the European Union 
 
 
The legitimacy crisis that the European Union (EU) is in today has become apparent in 
the aftermath of the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in mid 2005 by some member 
states. The longstanding lack of democratic accountability in the EU decision making 
mechanism is one of the major problems of the EU that has not yet been resolved. The 
current crisis and Turkey’s accession bid, which has officially begun with 3 October 
decisions, are in a considerable level of interaction due to the fact that Turkey is one of 
the reference points of the EU publics and member state governments with respect to 
the legitimacy crisis of the Union. Turkey’s membership to the EU will be subject to 
inter-state bargaining in the Intergovernmental Conferences during accession 
negotiations. The hesitation amongst government leaders regarding Turkey’s 
prospective membership is evident and will shape EU decisions to a great extent in the 
forthcoming years. The European citizens’ resistant attitudes matter very much in this 
sense, which seems to be very hard to be overcome. 
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Avrupa Birlii (AB) 2005 yilinin ortasından itibaren giderek derinleen bir meruiyet 
krizi içerisindedir. Bu durum, Anayasal Antlama’nın bazı üye devletlerde reddedilmesi 
ile açıkça ortaya çıkmıtır. AB karar verme mekanizmasında uzun süredir varolan 
demokratik sorumluluk yoksunluu AB’nin henüz çözümlenmemi en büyük 
sorunlarındandır. Birliin bu meruiyet krizi Türkiye’nin AB üyeliini etkilemektedir. 
Türkiye’nin 3 Ekim 2005’te balayan AB katılım süreci AB kamuoyunun Türkiye’ye 
bakı açısından dolayı bu krizi derinletirmektedir. Türkiye’nin AB üyelii, katılım 
müzakereleri süresince Hükumetlerarası Konferanslarda devletler arası pazarlıa maruz 
kalacaktır. Türkiye’nin beklenen üyelii ile ilgili olarak hükumet liderleri arasındaki 
tereddüt gelecek yıllarda AB kararlarını büyük ölçüde ekillendirecektir. Hükumet 
liderlerinin pozisyonları büyük ölçüde kamuoylarının etkisi altındadır. Aılması zor 
gözüken Avrupa vatandalarının bu dirençli tutumları bu bakımdan çok önem 
taımaktadır. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
On 3 October 2005, Turkey – European Union (EU) relations has moved a 
historic step forward when the accession negotiations began. The Turkish journey for 
EU membership has begun in 1959 and has not yet arrived at its final destination. The 
accession negotiations will most probably take at least ten years, during which certain 
problems can occur in some policy aspects. During the accession process, Turkey has to 
adopt 90000 pages of EU legislation, namely the acquis communautaire that even 
current member states have struggles in implementation. The negotiations, therefore, 
will be hard and difficult both for the EU and for Turkey. 
 
In this thesis, member states’ preferences’ impacts on Turkey’s accession bid 
will be analysed. As will be seen in the forthcoming chapters, the EU-Turkey relations 
revolve around member state bargaining as all other policies do so. In other words, the 
results of the Intergovernmental Conferences reflect to a great extent the relative powers 
of the member states in the bargaining process and the question of Turkish membership 
provides us a good example of this fact. In addition to this, one of the focus points of 
this thesis is that public attitudes and member state preferences interact with each other. 
In other words, not only government leaders’ preferences are formed within the limits 
of public positions but also political and opinion leaders’ rhetoric serves as a conductor 
in the formation of the public opinion with respect to Turkey. Therefore, the European-
Turkish relations are a very good example of how elite and mass attitudes interact and 
how the changing political environment of the EU is being shaped. 
 
The theoretical framework of this thesis is given in Chapter I. Three varying 
theoretical approaches are applied to the topic of this dissertation. The three theories 
that are used are the Liberal Intergovernmentalist Theory (LI), which enables one to 
make rational explanations on issues, the linkage theories of domestic politics and 
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international relations, which widen the scope of the central claim of rationalism, and 
the Multi-Level Governance (MLG) theory, which enables one to have a wider 
perspective with respect to the debate over supra-nationalism and 
intergovernmentalism. The core theory that will shape this thesis, however, is LI due to 
the fact that the theory itself is a synthesis. Moreover, in order to assert the significance 
of public opinion in policy formation, the linkage between domestic politics and 
international relations is used in explaining the elite-mass interactions. Moreover, it is 
affirmed in this thesis it is claimed that that government leaders’ preferences are shaped 
in accordance with their positions at home. This proposition, therefore, enables us to 
better explain the member states’ hesitation regarding Turkey’s prospective EU 
membership. 
 
Chapter II will endeavour to provide an empirical-historical analysis of Turkey-
EU relations. Taking the theory that is applied into account, the analysis will revolve 
around member states’ preferences rather than providing a straight-forward 
chronological history of EU-Turkey relations. In this chapter, after giving a very brief 
historical analysis of the evolution of the EU, Turkey-EU relations will be analysed 
with reference to certain turning points in the relations’ history. Moreover, the 
reformation process in Turkey that has been triggered after December 1999 is described. 
Turkey’s progress towards accession will be taken into consideration with reference to 
the Progress Reports of the European Commission from 1999 to 2004. Certain issues, 
such as civil-military relations, the Cyprus dispute, and minority and human rights are 
picked as concrete and important matters in the relations. Finally, the 3 October 2005 
decisions will be analysed and the analysis will be elaborated in Chapter III. 
 
The rhetoric of political leaders and opinion makers significantly affect the 
formation of public opinion. The process is “mutually interactive”; politicians have to 
take into account their constituents’ preferences in order to attract their favour and 
votes. By the same token, they also shape public opinion to a significant extent by 
means of communication and particularly their style and rhetoric. Therefore, in chapter 
III, a discourse analysis is conducted. Specifically, an in depth analysis will be done 
through the speeches of the political leaders and opinion makers in Germany, France, 
the United Kingdom and Austria. 
 
 3 
Finally, Chapter IV will endeavour to explain the mass attitudes on Turkey’s 
accession bid, which, it is believed, will help us to understand the public dynamics of 
government preferences. The purpose of the chapter is to provide an explanation for the 
reasons why public in the aforementioned member states oppose or support Turkish 
membership to the EU. Quantitative analysis will be done through using the spring 2005 
Eurobarometer survey data.   
 
Above all, Turkey’s accession bid will be analysed in this thesis in a theoretical 
and empirical manner. In other words, certain empirical data will be tried to be given, 
while the theoretical approaches will remain in every chapter. The 17 December 2004 
and 3 October 2005 decisions of the General Affairs and External Relations Council 
have been the main motive of the thesis, as Turkish-European relations has entered a 
new phase in history. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
The theoretical framework 
 
 
  
 The European Union (EU) is currently in a crisis, which reflects the most 
significant rise in Euro- scepticism in the EU since the 1970s, due to the failure of the 
ratification of the Constitutional Treaty. Whether the EU Constitution will be ratified in 
the near future or not; it is open to debate. The question that should be posed in 
analysing the current crisis is if the European citizens are ready to further integrate 
themselves into the supra-national structures of the EU. The major reasons for the crisis 
derive from the legitimacy of the EU and its institutions. In other words, the crisis can 
be named as a legitimacy crisis, which has been disregarded by the Member State 
governments and leaders since the foundation of the Union. Although overcoming the 
democratic deficit has been included in the agenda of the union apparently since the late 
1970s onwards, the EU has never ever achieved a great level of legitimacy, which 
national governments have, in the eyes of the public. Therefore, on 29 May, when the 
Frenchmen and women said no to the ratification of the European Union Constitution 
with 54.87 per cent, the legitimacy crisis has opened a new debate on the deepening of 
the EU and its policy of enlargement. 
 
 Turkey has applied for full membership to the EU right after the Greek 
application in 1959 and signed the Ankara Agreement in 1963, after which Turkish 
journey in full membership started.1 In 1996, Turkey joined the Customs Union (CU), 
                                               
1
 It was declared in the Association Agreement that when both parties were ready to 
fulfil the obligations, Turkey would become a member of the European Community. 
(Art.28) In addition, Turkey became the Associate Member of the European Economic 
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and has become the only country that is included in CU without full membership. 
Turkey was given candidacy status in 1999 Helsinki Summit. On 17 December 2004, it 
was decided in the Brussels European Council “to further Turkey’s membership process 
with the initiation of accession negotiations” on 3 October 2005.2 The negotiation 
process has started on the determined date as Turkey brought into force “the six specific 
items of legislation identified by the Commission” and signed the Protocol on the 
adaptation of Ankara Agreement, which extends the scope of Ankara Agreement to the 
10 new MS that has become full members in May 2004.3 
 
 Although it has been perfectly clear what Turkey had to do in order to start 
negotiations on October 3, MS preferences and positions in accordance with public 
opinion in the EU mean much. According to the latest Eurobarometer results, only 35 
per cent of the Europeans are pro Turkish membership as opposed to the 52 per cent of 
the people who are against Turkish accession. The picture is even worse in France and 
Germany, which are the two of predominant powers in the EU; only 21 per cent of the 
Germans and French people support Turkish membership.4 The least support is in 
Austria with only 10 per cent support. In addition to this, the strong (right) political 
parties in France and Germany, which has replaced the existing pro-Turkey leadership 
in the latter and a probable change in leadership in the former can be foreseen, are in 
favour of a privileged partnership with Turkey rather than full membership. For 
instance, Edmund Stoiber, the leader of Christian Social Union (CSU) which is the 
coalition partner of Christian Democratic Union (CDU) today, has said in his election 
campaign that “he would do ‘everything within his legal power’ to keep Turkey out of 
                                                                                                                                          
Community. The in depth empirical analysis of EU Turkey relations is given in the 
second chapter.  
 
2
 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs website; “Synopsis of the Turkish 
Foreign Policy”, available at www.mfa.gov.tr    
 
3
 See Council of the European Union, “Brussels European Council, 16/17 December 
2004: Presidency Conclusions”, published on 1 February 2005. However, Turkey 
declared that the so called Republic of Cyprus will not be allowed to benefit from the 
agreement until a solution to the Cyprus dispute is foreseen.  
 
4
 The European Commission, Eurobarometer 63, Public Opinion in the European 
Union, July 2005, pp.26-29 and p.99 
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the Union.”5 Further, Nicolas Sarkozy, the would-be French president after 2007 
elections and Angela Merkel, today’s German chancellor, jointly declared that they are 
both opposed to Turkish full-membership.6 
 
 The accession of Turkey will no doubt affect the EU than any other enlargement 
has. Turkey is far more populous than any other already acceded country. Consequently 
she will have more say in some institutions than any other MS except Germany when 
the accession negotiations are concluded. Negotiations with Turkey, therefore, will be 
far more different than previous negotiations; the EU has to lessen the probability of 
risk as much as possible not only because Turkey is much harder to digest but also due 
to the exhaustion it experienced after the last enlargement.7 Thus, the EU has an 
enlargement fatigue and is drowning in the deep ocean of internal problems; the 
member states prefer to lessen the level of risk as much as possible. The purpose of this 
thesis is to analyse the reflection of member states’ preferences in the EU, as opposition 
and discontent against Turkey’s full membership is explicitly visible. This chapter 
endeavours to project the theoretical framework of this dissertation. The Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist theory (LI) will be at the heart of this thesis, which presupposes 
that some states are more effective, and even predominant in the policy making process 
than other states and supranational institutions due to their relevant powers. On top of 
this, member states bargain in the European Council in accordance with their relative 
powers. Furthermore, the outcome of the decisions has to acceptable at home since the 
government leaders’ ultimate desire is to remain in power. Therefore, the LI theory is 
the core theory that will enlighten the future analysis of this thesis. 
 
The basic theoretical propositions on the evolution of EU policy making process 
will be given in this chapter. First and foremost, the major tenets of Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist theory and its application on the European economic and political 
                                               
5
 EU news, policy positions and EU actors website: www.euractive.com, “Rehn: Turkey 
is already a 'privileged partner' of the EU”, 14 July 2005   
 
6
 Honor Mahony, “German opposition leader woos Paris”, 19 July 
2005www.euobserver.com  
 
7
 Turkish daily newspaper, Radikal, interview with Director of Candidate Countries, 
Enlargement Directorate General: Pierre Mirel by Mehmet Ali Birand on 8 July 2005  
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integration will be provided. Secondly, the policy making process will briefly be 
described with reference to the relative powers of the EU institutions and Member State 
(MS) governments. In line with the theory that is adopted in this thesis – Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism (LI) – , the significance of convergence of interests between and 
bargaining among MS, and the impact of MS preferences on policy making as opposed 
to the supranational authorities of the Union – basically the European Commission, in 
the decision making processes will be the focus of analysis. Thirdly, the impact of 
domestic politics in MS on EU policy making; the increasing role of public opinion in 
the last two decades of the Union’s history and the legitimacy crisis that the former 
leads to will be discussed with reference to the ratification debate of the Constitutional 
Treaty (CT). Above all, the three theoretical approaches that have been stated before 
will constitute the theoretical framework of this thesis dissertation, which will be further 
explained below. 
 
 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism, the Two-Level Game Analysis and Multi-Level 
Governance 
 
 
To begin with, it would not be wrong to suggest that the EU somehow 
constitutes the most peculiar type of its kind; the EU is a community that is neither 
totally bound with supranational decision making organizations and institutions nor 
free-riding can easily be achieved. In addition, it is neither a purely economic and 
political community nor it acts directly in accordance with public opinion, although its 
regulations and decisions affect the daily life of European citizens directly. LI theory 
suggests that the integration process, which started with the emergence of European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) between France, Germany, Benelux Countries and 
Italy in 1952, is mainly triggered by convergence of interests between interest/pressure 
groups within and among MS and evolved through asymmetric interdependence and 
interstate bargaining – which will all be explained below – rather than “‘gradual’, 
‘automatic’, and ‘incremental’ toward deeper integration and greater supranational 
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influence”.8 For Moravcsik, neo-functionalism, which has been assumed by the Euro-
enthusiasts as the main ‘theory’ that could explain the European integration project, 
lacks coherence and empirical evidence in explaining the nature of the EU since it 
“advances long term predictions about the future of the EC without underlying, more 
specific theories that identify the decisive determinants of politicians’ choices among 
competing alternatives”.9 In other words, the major defect of the neo-functionalist 
‘framework’10 is that “neo-functionalism sought to construct a comprehensive synthesis 
without a reliable set of theoretical elements, to analyse dynamic change without a 
reliable account of static decision-making, to analyse endogenous causes without a 
reliable account of exogenous causes and, above all, to predict without a reliable 
explanation”.11 Hence, Haas’ neo-functionalist framework does not fully comply with 
the definition of what a theory is since it is not scientific in the Popperian sense as it 
lacks tentativeness since it predicts without any explanation and as it is untestable and 
unfalsibiable, it seeks to give unsupported speculation without any empirical evidence 
and without providing “micro-foundational theories of static preferences”12. Above all, 
neo-functionalism is not the theory that is the only tool to explain the European 
integration project. 
 
Synthesis in international relations (IR) theory, either contributes to the 
improvement of IR or stabs theory through aggregating propositions and killing the 
vivid contributions of opposing trends according to different scholars. However, it 
should be noted that “the broader the range of plausible conjectures tested, the wider the 
sources of data employed, and the more precise, rigorous, and reliable (the) 
                                               
8
 Ernst Haas quoted in Moravcsik, A. (1993) ‘Preferences and Power in the European 
Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach’, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 31(4): 473-524, p. 476 
 
9
 Moravcsik (1993) ‘Preferences and Power in the EC’, p.477 
 
10
 Moravcsik maintains that neo-functionalism is a framework rather than a theory. See, 
Moravcsik, A. (2005) ‘The European Constitutional Compromise and the 
Neofunctionalist Legacy’, Journal of European Public Policy, 12(2): 349-86  
 
11
 Moravcsik (2005) ‘The Constitutional Compromise’, p.355 
 
12
 Ibid., p.350 
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understanding of the relationship between these two, the more satisfying the state of 
international relations”.13 LI is a synthesis as it is neither purely liberal nor clearly 
realist. In other words, not only domestic politics and preferences but also rationality 
lies at the core of LI. It can be claimed that one of the most accurate ways of analysing 
the EU is LI since it is able to provide an overview of the evolution of European 
integration consistently and it is far away from the non-scientific assumptions of neo-
functionalism. This is one of the biggest reasons why LI is chosen as the theoretical tool 
of analysis in this thesis. LI is, therefore, not totally realist in the sense that economic 
interdependence and domestic power balances are more important than the link between 
state, power and ‘security’.14 The determinant role of relative power of member states in 
policy making in the EU lie at the core of the theory. Thus, LI suits the aim of this paper 
perfectly, as has been pointed out above, that is to explain the differences between 
positions and preferences of member states and their role in EU policy making 
processes.  
 
Further, according to LI, ‘national preference formation’ and ‘interstate strategic 
interaction’ are the two major tools of analysis of policy formation in the EU. Further, 
as has been mentioned above, there are three elements at the heart of LI: (1) “the 
assumption of rational state behaviour”, (2) “a liberal theory of national preference 
formation” and (3) “intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate negotiation”. For the first 
element, it can be stated that LI does not treat governments’ rational choices as ‘billiard 
balls’; rationality does not derive from “fixed preferences of wealth, security or power” 
but government actions are taken in accordance with domestically defined goals. In 
other words, “the foreign policy goals of national governments are viewed as varying in 
                                               
 
13
 Moravcsik, A. (2003) ‘Theory Synthesis in International Relations: Real Not 
Metaphysical”, International Studies Review, Part of a forum entitled "Are Dialogue 
and Synthesis Possible in International Relations?" 
 
14
 Cornett and Caporaso provide a very good analysis of European integration according 
to four different theories: neoclassical economic theory, neorealism, neoliberal 
institutionalism and functionalism and neofunctionalism, through which they state they 
“attempt less to test these four bodies of thought than to illustrate the strengths and 
limitations of each” (p.220). See, Cornett, L. and Caporaso, J. A. ‘“And Still It Moves!” 
State Interests and Social Forces in the European Community”, pp.219-49 in Rosenau J. 
N. and Czempiel E. (Eds.) (1995) Governance Without Government: Order and Change 
in World Politics, Cambridge University Press, Great Britain   
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response to shifting pressure from domestic social groups”, which compete for political 
influence and “whose preferences are aggregated through political institutions”.15 
Hence, the foreign policy behaviour of states is formed via “the interaction of demand 
and supply, of preference and strategic opportunities”.16 
 
For our purposes, changes in governmental and presidential authorities alter 
states’ preferences and positions as well. In other words, as national preferences are 
determined by domestically defined goals, governments’ positions change in foreign 
policy making in accordance with the preferences and pressures of societal groups that 
delegate power to governmental agents, those of which are responsible to aggregate 
preferences. In addition to this, as  
 
the primary interest of governments is to maintain themselves in office; in 
democratic societies, this requires the support of a coalition of domestic voters, 
parties, interest groups and bureaucracies, whose views are transmitted, directly or 
indirectly, through domestic    
  
 
Therefore, national preferences are not necessarily formed by economic 
interdependence or strategic, geopolitical interests, which will be explained below, but 
through domestic pressures that limit actions of governments, the ultimate desire of 
which is to remain in power. 
  
How, therefore, MS in the EU has been and are able to form common policies, 
which directly affect the lives of millions of citizens? The conceptions of ‘convergence 
of interests’ and delegation and ‘pooling of sovereignty’ will be helpful in explaining 
the policy making mechanism in the EU. First of all, in the processes of interstate 
interaction and policy co-ordination, governments cooperate and form a single policy 
only when their interests converge. In other words, to apply this to our previous 
proposition that government policies are formed through domestically defined goals, 
“international agreement requires that the interests of dominant domestic groups in 
                                               
 
15
 Moravcsik (1993) ‘Preferences and Power in the EC’, pp.479-81 
 
16
 Ibid., p.481 
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different countries converge; where they diverge, co-ordination is precluded.”17 
However, it is crucially important to note that not only domestic pressure but also the 
role of relative power of MS in interstate bargaining plays a major role in the policy 
making process. In other words, convergence of national preferences among MS and 
relative powers of MS are interrelated. The more powerful a MS is, the more likely it is 
to form the direction of pursued policies. Moravcsik claims that most EU common 
policies are predominated by three economically and politically most powerful states of 
the EU: France, Germany and Great Britain.18 Thus, for instance, it was when all 
countries interests converged in the mid-1980s to reform, through the election of a Tory 
government in Britain in 1979, French economic crises due to Keynesian economic 
policies and the sympathy of Kohl government in Germany towards reform.19 Although 
more powerful states dominate EU policy making processes, other MS’ influences 
should not be underestimated due to their veto power in foreign policy making. Despite 
the fact that the EU has been moving towards more integration via increasing the scope 
of qualified majority voting (QMV) system in more policy areas rather than requiring 
unanimity of votes, which donates smaller states with the power of veto, smaller states 
can still impact the policy making processes by forming opposition blocks-blocking 
minorities.20 Hence, smaller states should not be disregarded in the analysis of policy 
co-ordination. Nevertheless, more powerful states are more influential than smaller 
member states. It is also worth to mention the concept of ‘asymmetric interdependence’ 
in the EU, which balances the relationship between small and large member states. As 
has been stated above, according to LI, the more powerful a state is, the more weight it 
has in policy making. In contrast, the more a MS desires a policy to be implemented, the 
more she has to lose. In other words, in EU (and European Community) history, “those 
who gained the most economically from integration compromised the most …, whereas 
                                               
 
17
 Ibid. p.477 
 
18
 See Moravcsik, A. (1991) ‘Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests 
and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community’, International Organization, 
45(1): 19-56 
 
19
 Cornett and Caporaso, ‘And Still It Moves’, p.231  
 
20
 The details of QMV and its impacts on EU policy making processes will be provided 
in the forthcoming section of this paper. 
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those who gained the least or for whom the costs of adaptation were highest imposed 
conditions”. Thus, this is the reason why, for instance, during the last enlargement, 
Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain opposed enlargement as they would receive less 
funds if new members were included, so they received cohesion and structural funds the 
most in order not to be the losers of enlargement. Similarly, Central and Eastern 
European Members will oppose Turkish accession in the near future due to the fact that 
they will receive fewer funds if Turkey becomes a MS. Thus, it would not be wrong to 
suggest that, according to the asymmetrical interdependence theory, more powerful 
states can impose policies that they favour the most, although they have to offer a sort 
of a carrot to the smaller MS.  
 
Above all, MS in the EU delegate or pool their sovereignties (1) for the sake of 
‘European federalism’, (2) due to the “need to economize on the generation and analysis 
of information by centralizing technocratic functions” and (3) in order to constrain one 
another.21 In addition, LI disregards neither of the following neofunctionalist 
propositions that (a) “national preferences develop in response to exogenous changes in 
the nature of issue specific functional interdependence”, (b) interstate negotiation and 
bargaining (relative) power go hand in hand, and (c) “delegation to supranational 
institutions is designed to facilitate credible commitments”. Rather, LI disregards the 
exogenous nature of integration and emphasizes endogenous interstate bargaining, 
which “reflects international state action on the basis of relative power than 
supranational entrepreneurship, and unlike neo-functionalism, provides a clear 
theoretical starting point for explaining delegation to supranational institutions”. 22 
 
The Liberal intergovernmentalist theory constitutes the theoretical framework of 
this thesis. However, a theory synthesis will be adopted to have a more coherent 
explanation on member states’ preferences on Turkey’s full membership; to better 
understand future prospects in EU-Turkey relations. First of all, the importance of 
public’s attitudes in policy making process is significantly important as public grants 
governments legitimacy through approving the foreseen decisions by the political 
                                               
21
 Moravcsik, A. (1998) The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from 
Messina to Maastricht, London: UCL Press, see, Introduction, pp.1-17 
 
22
 Moravcsik, A. (2005) ‘The European Constitutional Compromise’, p.358 
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leaders. To put it correctly, decision and policy makers has to be responsive in terms of 
getting international agreements accepted at home. Thus,  
 
Diplomatic tactics and strategies are constrained simultaneously by what other states 
will accept and what domestic constituencies will ratify. To conclude a negotiation 
successfully, the statesman must bargain on these two tables, both reaching an 
international agreement and securing its domestic ratification.23 
 
In other words, government leaders are bound with their position at home and because 
they seek to remain in power, they are restricted with their strong/weak position in 
domestic politics.  
 
 Despite the fact that this thesis adopts LI theory in explaining Turkish accession, 
Multi-level governance theory has a certain level of credibility since national 
governments role is not as central as it is claimed to be in LI. In other words, 
sovereignty has eroded considerably especially after the 1980s and decision making 
consequently is done in a cycle of its own through supra-national authorities.24 On top 
of economic integration, which has always been the priority of the EU, the Single 
European Act, the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and the Constitutional 
Treaty have all been forwarded to increase the supranational character of the EU via 
increasing qualified majority voting in the European Council, strengthening the 
European Parliament and reserving the important roles and responsibilities of the 
European Commission as the motor of integration. The role of the supranational actors, 
therefore, should not be underestimated as they not only function as a facilitator in 
agreements between member states but also a certain level of polity in the supra-
national authorities is existent. Furthermore, sub-national actors’ role has been 
increased through, i.e. the Committee of Regions, in the policy making process, which 
grants credibility to the argument that decision making is not limited with state-centric 
approach. Above all, although the LI theory contains a great level of plausibility, the 
importance of supra-national and sub-national actors in the EU policy making process 
                                               
 
23Moravcsik, A., “Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International 
Bargaining”, in Evans et. al.(Eds.), International Bargaining and Domestic Politics: 
Double-Edged Diplomacy, (1993), University of California Press, London   
 
24
 See, Marks, et. al., (1996) “European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. 
Multi-Level Governance”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 34(3), pp.341-78  
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should not be undervalued. The European Commission’s responsibilities provide a good 
example for the two theories in this respect; according to the Liberal 
intergovernmentalist theory, the Commission draws up legislation not autonomously 
and spontaneously but in order to meet member state demands. However, the Multi-
level governance theory asserts that demands do not necessarily come from member 
states but from the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and 
regional governments and other supra and sub national institutions. Therefore, it should 
be made clear that ‘state’ in the EU is not the single actor that initiates policies. 
 
 For the purposes of this thesis, in sum, the synthesis of the three approaches is 
important in the sense as follows. First of all, LI is the core approach since member 
states’ positions and preferences are still at the heart of the decision making mechanism. 
In addition, stronger member states’ influence, especially the impacts of the big three: 
Germany, France, and the UK in the policy making processes is greater than less 
powerful states.25 Further, member states bargain not only with respect to their relative 
powers but also their win-sets at home. In other words, government leaders have to take 
their positions in domestic politics into consideration while bargaining as their 
bargaining power is constrained by their constituents. This drives us to the second 
approach, which is the Robert Putnam’s domestic politics – international relations 
linkage, which will be analysed in great depth and detail in Chapter III and IV. Because 
leaders’ ultimate desire is to remain in power, they act in accordance with their 
positions at home. In addition to this, the win-sets of leaders and their bargaining power 
are negatively correlated; the larger the win-set of a member state is, the less bargaining 
power it has and vice versa. In other words, in smaller win-sets provides the negotiator 
the necessary incentives to insist on the pursued agreements. Lastly, multi-level 
governance theory has to be placed in this thesis due to the reason that state is an 
important but not the only actor in policy formation. The EU has a unique structure of 
its own,   and composed of numerous bodies that more or less have influence in policy 
making. Turkey’s membership to the EU is important in this sense due to the fact that it 
is one of the most controversial issues among EU policies and there is a great amount of 
hesitation among EU member states and publics. Therefore, the three theoretical 
                                               
25
 A discourse analysis of the attitudes of governments in Austria in addition to these 
three member states is given in the Chapter III.   
 15 
approaches will help this thesis to form a coherent analysis of member state preferences 
on Turkey’s accession bid.          
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
 
The Empirical and historical analysis of Turkey-EU Relations 
 
 
 On 9 November 2005, in its strategy paper for candidate countries – Croatia and 
Turkey – and for potential candidate countries in the Western Balkans26, the European 
Commission declared that the future Enlargement policy will be handled on the basis of 
three principles of ‘consolidation’, ‘conditionality’ and ‘communication’.27 The EU 
Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn stated on 15 November that enlargement is 
EU’s one of the most powerful policy tools “as it exemplifies the essence of the EU’s 
                                               
26
 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FYRM), Serbia and Montenegro and Kosovo are identified as potential candidates in 
the Enlargement II package. See, European Commission, 9 November 2005, The 
enlargement package 2005, (MEMO/05/412), Brussels:  
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/05/412&format=P
DF&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. The Commission recommended 
candidate status to be granted by the Council for FYRM.  The Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement (SAA) negotiations have recently started with Serbia and 
Montenegro and will start with Bosnia and Herzegovina in a very short period of time. 
Albania has already signed the SAA with the EU in 2003 and paves the way to conclude 
negotiations despite low level of progress.   
 
27
 The three Cs can be summarized as follows; consolidation refers to the EU’s 
authority over demanding more on top of existing requirements, while for 
conditionality, the EU’s aim is to make sure that the Enlargement process proceeds 
stage by stage. Communication is to improve the debate in the public and among 
European citizens. See, European Commission, 9 November 2005, Consolidation, 
conditionality, communication – the strategy of the enlargement policy, (IP/05/1392), 
Brussels: 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/1392&format=PDF
&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en           
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soft power”28 which broadly but significantly explains what the enlargement policy 
holds for. 
   
A completely new phase in Turkish-European relations is opened on the eve of 3 
October after 30 hours of bargaining between Member States regarding Turkey’s 
accession as a full member to the EU. In her 42 years of European journey on top of 
more than two hundred years of close relations with the West and Westernization 
processes, Turkey, for the first time, has been concretely included in the European 
integration project and the Union’s policy of enlargement.29 Despite the fact that the 
basis of the agreement has not been the smoothest ever as can also be observed by the 
length and harshness of the General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting, 
Turkey, today, is a country that is responsible for adopting 90000 pages of EU laws and 
practices – the Acquis Communautaire – in addition to political, economic and cultural 
reforms. At the same time, the EU will have to commit itself to Turkish enlargement to 
a great extent in the next decade or more and fulfil its promises in order not to alienate 
one of the biggest Member States of the future, Turkey.30    3 October is “truly historic 
for Europe and for the whole of the international community”31 as United Kingdom 
(UK) Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, who is one of the leading figures in the EU due to 
the UK’s Presidency and who is the champion of the Turks due to his success in 
                                               
28
 Olli Rehn, Speech at the Plenary Session of the European Parliament, 15 November 
2005, The 2005 Enlargement Package, (SPEECH/05/693), Strasbourg: 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/693&format=
PDF&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en    
 
29
 On 20 October, the screening process has started in “Science and Research” chapter, 
which is presumably one of the easiest chapters. The whole process will be concluded in 
around one year.  
 
30
 In other words, as a major trend in acceding and member states, public opinion 
follows a declining trend as a matter of fact. Around 80 percent of the public in Turkey 
is pro-EU membership today. However the accession process and the decline in public 
support for the EU are positively correlated, which will be elaborated in the next 
chapter. Thus, the EU should not further alienate the public in Turkey in order to 
accomplish the goal of full-membership. 
 
31
 The Guardian, “EU starts talking with Turkey”, by Nicholas Watt, 7 October 2005:  
http://browse.guardian.co.uk/search?search=Jack+Straw&lDim=0&No=30&Nso=1&N
=0&Ns=P_PublicationDate  
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reaching a compromise in the wordings in the negotiation framework, has stated. It is 
also worth to note that Straw proclaimed all EU Member States, Turkey and the 
international community as ‘winners’ of the game, which has started in 1963.  From 3 
October 2005 onwards, Turkey and the EU officials will start negotiating 35 chapters of 
the Acquis one by one in the aftermath of the screening process. The negotiations are 
not expected to end before 2014 for the very simple fact of EU’s financial perspective 
up to 2014, which does not take Turkey into account at all. Thus, both the Europeans 
and Turkey will no doubt face many difficulties and complications, which will evolve 
hand in hand with the deepened relations, on top of the existing problems such as the 
Cyprus dispute or the resistance among the Member States of the Union and among 
European citizens themselves against the future membership of Turkey, which will also 
constitute the framework of this chapter. 
  
As has been provided in the first chapter, there is a wide range of opposition 
among the Europeans against Turkey’s full membership in the EU. Although the 
reasons of this general pattern vary in different MS, one of the most important bases of 
the hesitation of the Europeans meets at a common point, which is the question of 
whether Turkey is ‘European’ or not in many respects. Despite, technically, Turkish 
accession negotiations will be no different than previous enlargement processes, the 
accession negotiations will be ‘harder’ and ‘tougher’ not only because the EU has an 
enlargement fatigue but also because Turkey is far bigger, poorer and more populous on 
top of its Islamic character and geographically or culturally more eastern. In this 
chapter, the analysis of European-Turkish relations will be divided into three periods. 
Firstly, a brief historical analysis of the evolution of Turkey-EU relations from 1959 – 
Turkish application to European Community membership, to 1996 – Customs Union 
Agreement between Turkey and the EU will be provided. Secondly, the period between 
1999 Helsinki Summit, where Turkey’s candidacy status was recognised and 17 
December 2004 decisions, according to which Turkey would begin accession 
negotiations from 3 October onwards. Finally, some analytical observations will be 
made on important official documents concerning Turkey, i.e. the negotiating 
framework for Turkey. In sum, the main focus of this chapter will be to analyse the 
positions, interests and preferences of the EU, EU Member States and Turkey in the 
previous year – 6 October 2004 – 3 October 2005.                        
 
 19 
 
 
 
I. Strong but weird; longstanding nature of Euro-Turkish relations: Does one 
misinterpret ‘the other’? 
 
 
The Turks and the Europeans have been in interaction for more than thousand 
years, with ups and downs in the relationship. Europe, or rather Europeanness has 
always been a carrot for the Turks, either in the Ottoman period or in the Republican 
era. In other words, being accepted as European/Western by the Europeans has always 
served as a catalyst in reforming the political system in Turkey. For the Ottomans, in 
order to survive in world politics, the only way out was to follow or imitate what the 
Europeans had been doing from 18th century onwards. Although there had been various 
trends, the main path of the Ottoman ruling elite had been being as close as possible to 
the Europeans. This stream reflected itself in many areas of Ottoman life style as well. 
However, modernization was limited with the elites; the periphery was disregarded. 
Nevertheless, from 1839 onwards, the Europeanization process could be considered as 
the mainstream ideology that was dominant in the centre. In the republican period, there 
was a radical change with respect to the centre and to every aspect of life of the 
periphery. The first and foremost goal of “the Kemalist elite was to ‘reach the 
contemporary level of civilisation’ by establishing its political, economic and 
ideological prerequisites, such as the creation of an independent nation-state, the 
fostering of industrialisation and the construction of a secular and modern national 
identity’.32 Thus, the major elements in the construction of Turkish identity and the 
identity of the Republic was secularism, which was regarded as the main obstacle in the 
modernization process, and nationalism, which was the only route in founding a modern 
nation-state.  
 No doubt, Turkish-European relations entered a new phase with the foundation 
of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 in the first place as a 
matter of changing structure of the Continent through an integration process, and more 
                                               
32
 Aydin, Senem and Keyman, E. Fuat, “European Integration and the Transformation 
of Turkish Democracy”, Centre for European Policy Studies, EU-Turkey Working 
papers, No.2, August 2004, p.3 
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significantly the Turkish application to the European Economic Community EEC in 
1959 in the second. Turkey-EU relations will be analysed in this chapter through 
providing the major turning points in relations and in EU’s history. In addition, in line 
with the theory that has been outlined in the first chapter, the focus will be to provide 
empirical examples of how EU MS preferences impact policy making in the EU. 
Likewise, the probable Turkish future membership vis-à-vis public opinion in MS will 
also be taken into consideration. In other words, the picture of the relationship between 
domestic politics that reflects hesitation against Turkey’s membership and significant 
events vis-à-vis Turkey-EU relations will be endeavoured to be given. The political and 
economic determinants in relations will be the major tenets of analysis. On the other 
hand, the cultural element will also be addressed as a matter of the origins of EU-
Turkey relations. Both Turks and Europeans regarded one another either and mostly as 
enemies, or ‘the other’ of each other, or as ally against other ‘others’. The Turk 
constituted the ‘other’ for the Europeans, with whom they identified themselves for 
centuries. Hence, it is not a big surprise to hear the French President Jacques Chirac, 
saying, Turkey has to go through a ‘major cultural revolution’33, despite the fact that 
culture is not a determinant in Turkish accession. Above all, Turkey-EU relations and 
the debate on Turkish membership in the EU are not only about Copenhagen political 
and economic criteria, but also the relations that have been framed by the element of 
culture in an increasing fashion. This, somewhat, reflects the reasons and consequences 
of the concurrent legitimacy crisis in the EU as well. 
 
 
 
 
The Political and Economic Dynamics within the EU 
  
In 1957, what Jean Monnet and Robert Schumann had in mind was that the 
EEC, which was founded by the Treaty of Rome by six European states – France, 
Germany, Italy and the Benelux Countries, would lead to a never ending process of 
integration through ‘spill-over’ under a supreme supranational authority. The ultimate 
consequence of the integration process would be a more peaceful continent in contrast 
                                               
33
 Honor Mahony, “Chirac says Turkey needs major cultural revolution to join EU”, 
05.10.2005, http://euobserver.com/15/20012 
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destructions of the past and the sufferings of the past. In 1965, the Treaty of Merger 
united ECSC, European Atomic Agency (EURATOM) and EEC. Thus, the nation states 
of Europe, once upon a time each of which had more or less imperial rule over the 
world, would cooperate in every aspect of politics and economics and thus would not 
fight against each other again. In other words, because Europe was totally destructed 
after World War II, achieving peace was the major concern among European elite. 
According to the founders of the Union, through an automatic ‘spill-over’ process, 
which is, once the cooperation process starts, it inevitably and automatically spills-over 
other fields, the most peculiar kind of regional organization would emerge. Hence, at 
the end, individual interests would be replaced by collective interest, national identities 
would disappear and loyalties would shift to supranational loyalties. However, the 
picture was not as simple as the founding fathers’ ideals. National interests superseded 
collective interests of the Community especially during the 1960s and 70s. Decisions 
could hardly be taken due to the insistences of Member States (MS) over national 
interests rather than collective interests. Indeed, this is somehow the impact of President 
Charles De Gaulle, who came to power in 1958 and became the President of the Fifth 
Republic of France. De Gaulle, who was a strong French nationalist, was not in favour 
of the idea of European integration or rather the ‘pooling of sovereignty’.34 Thus, 
following the ‘empty-chair crisis’ of 1965-1966, when no decision could be taken due 
to the inexistence of the French side at the table, unanimous voting was brought into 
agenda, namely the ‘Luxembourg Compromise’ of 1966. As a result, there was no more 
supremacy of the Commission since every decision had been subject to every single MS 
vote up until 1987 Single European Act (SEA) of 1989. Thus, it would not be wrong to 
suggest that the ideal of a supranational authority in the decision making mechanism 
died in 1966 to a great extent until late 1980s.  
 
Adding the recession in European economies on top of high level of 
unemployment, the 1970s was the era of Euro-scepticism; the future of the Community 
was in great danger. Another reason why there was high Euro-scepticism was because 
of the lack of political will to take important decisions at the supranational level due to 
the impact of unanimous decision making that has been explained above. However, 
                                               
34
 It is worth to state that the decision making mechanism today is the outcome of 
French – De Gaulle – nationalism since it was him who brought the conception of 
‘unanimity’ to the EC institutional setting. 
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either because of the changing global-political environment as a matter of the decline in 
the power of the Soviet Union, or because of the boost in European economies at the 
beginning of 1980s, the EC was no more a sleeping beauty. The 1980s witnessed the 
rebirth of the Community from its ashes, which ultimately led to the formation of three 
pillar structure of the European Union (EU).35 From then onwards, the EU MS have 
continuously integrated; the processes of deepening and widening have been going hand 
in hand.  
 
As has been stated above, the EC was under major transformation in terms of 
deepening. The EC got rid of the Euro-scepticism that was dominant in the 1970s and 
early 1980s and re-entered a process of rapid firstly economic then political integration. 
The second founding father of the EU – former head of the Commission Jacques Delors 
– initiated a package that proposed reform in the decision making mechanism, which for 
him was the major source of Euro-pessimism among MS. The Intergovernmental 
Conference in December 1985 developed the Single European Act (SEA), based on the 
Commission’s White Paper, namely “Completing the Internal Market”, which mainly 
foresaw institutional reform. The main contributions of the SEA had been to increase 
the competences of the supranational authorities, introduction of qualified majority 
voting (QMV) in further areas of policies, introduction of co-operation procedure to 
initiate the involvement of the European Parliament (EP) in the decision making 
procedures in order to increase the democratic accountability of the Community in the 
eyes of the public.36 On top of everything, however, the “single, biggest market and 
trading unit in the world” had been created and cohesion had been introduced for the 
purpose of preventing “two-speed Europe”.37  This process of institutional reform and 
                                               
35
 The most supranational pillar of the EU is the European Communities, which is 
composed of ECSC (expired on 23 July 2002), EURATOM and EEC. Today, most of 
the decisions in the first pillar are taken through Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in 
the EU. The other pillars – ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’ and ‘Justice 
Freedom and Security’ still require unanimity in the decision making process.    
 
36
 For further information and analysis on SEA, see, Fitzmaurice, John, “An Analysis of 
the European Community’s Co-operation Procedure”, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 26(4), June 1988, pp.389-400   
 
37
 McCormick, John, (2002), Understanding the European Union, The European Union 
Series, Palgrave, London  
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of further integration continued progressively in the following years by the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) – Maastricht Treaty (1991), Amsterdam Treaty (1996), and 
Treaty of Nice (2000). Specifically, the TEU created the three pillars, and name of the 
European Community had been renamed as European Union. In addition to this, single 
European currency was initiated to be completed in 1999, the concept of “European 
citizenship” was created and the co-decision procedure, which gave the EP the power to 
serve as a body in legislation in certain areas. The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced 
common policies on the issues in the second pillar, i.e. asylum policy and immigration. 
Finally, the Treaty of Nice redefined the tasks and the character of the EU institutions; it 
mainly changed the voting rules and procedures.38 These continuous processes of 
institutional reformation were mainly aimed at further integrating EU MS through 
increasing the competences of the supranational institutions. However, as a matter of 
increasing impact of domestic politics in the EU affairs, increasing the role of the EP 
has been another goal in reformation since the more MS were integrated, the more the 
public were affected by EU decisions. In other words, almost 80 per cent of MS law 
happened to be EU law. As an ultimate result, public has been directly subject to EU 
decisions, contrary to the previous years. Therefore, increasing the role of the EP would 
serve for legitimacy purposes by increasing democracy in the EU especially in the 90s 
and in the millennium. It is also worth to state that if the Constitutional Treaty was 
ratified, the EU today and in the forthcoming years would have a more supranational 
character and would be working more efficiently.           
 
 
Turkey’s relations with the EU 
 
In 1959, Turkey applied for associate membership to the EC right after the 
Greek application and signed Ankara Treaty – the Association Agreement in 12 
September 1963, and Additional Protocol in 1970, both of which were aimed to be the 
road maps towards Turkish involvement in the Customs Union (CU), and became an 
associate member of the EEC in 1963.39 A three stage process was visualized in the 
                                               
38
 Ibid., p.82 
 
39
 Article 1 of the Additional Protocol laid down “the conditions, arrangements and 
timetables for implementing the transitional stage referred to in Article 4 of the 
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Association Agreement, which would also lead to Turkey’s membership in the 
Community. The terms of the Agreement was limited as agricultural products and free 
movement of labour/persons remained out of it. Nevertheless, following the prepatory 
and transitional stages, Turkey was envisaged to realize CU in the final stage, which 
would ultimately open the road to full membership in the EC. Thus, it would not be 
wrong to assert that ‘the logic of the extended time framework for membership was 
based on the argument that the early exposure of the Turkish economy to full 
competition … would jeopardize Turkey’s industrial development itself’.40 
 
Turkey-EU relations during the 1970s were on shaky grounds either because 
domestic politics in Turkey was highly unstable, or because the EC itself was in 
struggle in forming truly common policies, the main reasons of which were mainly 
economic instability and high level of unemployment. In the bipolar world, Turkey was 
one of the main allies of the Western camp although she had followed a protectionist 
model of economic development during the 1970s following the major trend in the 
world. However, it should also be noted that following the 1973 oil crisis, which can be 
considered as the first major success of the oil-rich previously colonized countries 
against the rich North, Turkey had very much been economically and politically 
destabilized. In other words, the 1970s were years of anarchy and political polarization 
and fragmentation for Turkey which ultimately led her to destabilize her position in 
international relations.41 
                                                                                                                                          
agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community 
and Turkey”. The original document is available at European Union website: 
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=
EN&numdoc=21970A1123(01)&model=guichett  
See also  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/pdf/association_agreement_1964_en.pdf 
for 1963 Ankara Agreement. The Additional Protocol entered into force in January 
1973. 
 
40
 For an in depth information, see, Öni, Ziya, “Luxembourg, Helsinki and Beyond: 
Towards an Interpretation of Recent Turkey-EU Relations”, paper presented at the 
annual Conference of the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies (BRISMES) held 
at the University of Cambridge, England, July 2-5, 2000.  
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 See Özbudun, Ergun and Tachau Frank, “Social Change and Electoral Behaviour in 
Turkey: Toward a Critical Realignment”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 
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There was also an additional complication in the EU-Turkey relations that is 
Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus in 1974.42 In the 1970s, although the EU was still 
uncertain over Cyprus, as all countries – Turkey, Greece and the Republic of Cyprus – 
were associate members, Turkish intervention in the island complicated matters in EU-
Turkey relations. When the Greek junta took over the government and claimed the 
annexation of the island to Greece, on the basis of Turkey’s right to intervene according 
to the 1960, Treaty of Guarantee43 Turkey sent troops to the Northern territories of the 
island. Turkey occupied the Northern part of the island on the basis of the argument that 
the Turkish Cypriots were slaughtered by the Greek Cypriots. According to the Zurich 
and London Agreements, all Turkey, Greece and United Kingdom44 had the right to 
intervene in the established affairs of the island. In other words, the sufferings of the 
Turkish Cypriots and the insistence of the Makarios45 government over the ideal of 
enosis, which is simply the ideal of unity with Greece through particularly strongly 
                                                                                                                                          
6(4), October 1975, pp.460-80; See also Çarkolu, Ali, “The Turkish Party System in 
Transition: Party Performance and Agenda Change”, Political Studies, XLVI, pp.544-71   
 
42
 We should first and foremost note that the Cyprus dispute between Turkey and 
Greece is a longstanding and yet insoluble issue. Thus, one should be careful while 
reading the lines above and should not totally commit him/her to what has been written 
above. This thesis dissertation deals with the Cyprus dispute with a Turkish perspective 
not solely because the author is Turkish but because the Cyprus debacle would 
constitute a separate dissertation and it would be beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
 
43
 See, Müftüler-Baç, Meltem, (1997), Turkey’s Relations with a Changing Europe, 
Manchester, United Kingdom, Manchester University Press 
 
44
 Cyprus had been ruled by the British from 1922 onwards. Although the British 
government offered Cyprus to Greece during the World War I in order to open another 
battle field against the Central Powers, namely Bulgaria, the Greeks rejected the offer. 
However, the British offer made Greece be aware of the fact that there was a possibility 
to apply enosis as Cyprus was not really crucially important for the British and led them 
to claim rights over the completely Greek governance of the island. The debates over 
the governance of the island prolonged up until the Zurich Agreement when both Greek 
and Turkish sides made concessions and when Britain became aware of the fact that it 
would be better to have bases in the island rather than colonizing it.     
 
45
 He was the Archbishop in 1950 and he can be claimed to be the leader of enosis. He 
was extremely powerful due to the fact that Greek Cypriot politics was very much 
religiously and nationalist oriented. Both components fitted the profile of Makarios.    
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religiously oriented nationalist discourses in terms of ideology, led to the ultimate 
military intervention of Turkish government.46  
 
It is worth to note the significance of Greek-Turkish relations within the analysis 
of Turkey-EC relations as a matter of the balancing role of the West over Turkey-
Greece relations. In other words, both had followed more or less similar paths in their 
process of Westernization in the bipolar system up until 1981, when Greece became a 
full member of the Community. After the foundation of Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus that has not been recognized by the EC/EU, therefore, the West gave an end to 
its balancing role and Turkey was left alone despite its strategic significance and 
geographical proximity in the Cold War era. Thus, after the Turkish intervention in 
Cyprus, Greece applied for EC membership not only because of the rivalry with the 
Turks, but also due to security reasons and became a member of the EC in 1981. 
Although both Greece and Turkey belonged to the same camp through North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization – NATO membership, Greeks regarded the Cyprus intervention as 
‘invasion’ and soak EC membership in order to strengthen its position, or in other 
words, security incentives against Turkey. Greece had been able to Europeanize and to 
internationalize her conflicts with Turkey ‘through EU’s decision making 
mechanisms’.47 Greece, above all, became a member of the EC in 1981 and obviously 
strengthened her position in major areas of dispute such as Cyprus against Turkey.48  
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 Turkey-EU relations, therefore, were highly deteriorated during the 1970s not 
only because of the Cyprus issue but also because of the anarchical and unstable 
political environment in Turkey.49 Moreover, membership in the EC was not primarily 
important in Turkish governments’ agenda. Thus, it might be claimed that Turkey also 
failed to improve relations with the EC during the 1970s. Following the 12 September 
1980 military intervention in Turkey, relations with the EC, which had already been 
frozen in 1978 unilaterally by Turkey, “the Association Agreement and all relations 
with the Community were effectively frozen”.50 Hence, Turkey somehow missed the 
opportunity to become a full member of the EC, which could have been very likely 
when one takes Greek-Turkish relations into consideration. 
 
 Unlike the Latin American military take-overs, the self perceived duty of the 
Turkish military was to normalize the state of affairs and leave office as soon as 
possible. In 1983, three years after the intervention, multi-party elections took place and 
Turgut Özal, achieved the majority of votes and the Motherland Party – Anavatan 
Partisi – ANAP came into power with a single party government. The major 
contribution of the ANAP government was to abandon import substitution 
industrialization (ISI) – inward looking and to liberalize the economy through export 
oriented-outward looking economic strategy. In addition, there had been considerable 
political reforms with respect to fundamental rights and liberties. In 1987, Turkey 
applied for full membership of the EC.51 In addition, EC membership was at the core of 
Özal government’s foreign policy agenda from 1987 onwards. However, either because 
the EC had been transforming in terms of deepening and because what had recently 
happened in Turkey was completely in contrary to the ideals of the EC – that is 
democracy and human rights, the European Commission declared on 18 December 
1989 that Turkey’s accession was unlikely, meaning out of the agenda but proposed to 
proceed in establishing CU as had been envisaged in the Association Agreement.  
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Above all, with respect to the evolution of the EU and of EU-Turkey relations, it 
can be stated that the more the EU moved towards a supranational order, the more the 
relations between the EU and Turkey had deteriorated. Although the impact of domestic 
political developments in Turkey and in the EU member states and the changes in the 
international environment and order on EU-Turkey relations cannot be underestimated, 
the evolution of the EU to a more supranational structure and the changes in the 
relations can be correlated. As has been stated above, the high level of economic and 
political integration via institutional reforms and new policy fields have been triggered 
as soon as the European economies started to recover. In other words, member states 
got rid of Euro-scepticism when domestic economic difficulties, i.e. recession or 
inflation were finally over. Thus, one could assert that it would be much easier for 
Turkey to join the EU at the beginning of the 1980s as Greece did due to the fact that 
there were very limited rules and procedures – criteria – for membership. However, 
when the EU underwent a deepening process, the response to Turkey’s application in 
1987 was ultimate. Today, the picture is different; the EU is incomparably more 
supranational than it was in the 1970s but under pressure of economic difficulties, while 
has recently initiated accession towards Turkey. Consequently, it is not wrong to state 
that the accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU will be very hard and 
difficult.       
 
 
II. 1999-2004: Turkey’s progress towards accession 
 
Turkey signed a Customs Union Agreement (CUA) with the EU in 1995 as 
foreseen by the Ankara Treaty, which was put into effect in 1 January 1996. However, 
Turkey-EU relations were driven into one of the deepest crisis in 1997, when the EU 
MS decided not to include Turkey in the enlargement process, which led the Turkish 
government to freeze relations with the EU. The main reason of Turkey’s aggressive 
response was mainly not granting Turkey candidacy status and declaring post-
communist Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), some of which lagged far 
behind Turkey in terms of their market economies and democracies, and Cyprus and 
Malta as candidates in the ‘Agenda 2000’ Luxembourg Summit. Turkey, therefore, 
froze her relations with the EU until when Turkey was convinced through being 
 29 
officially recognized as a candidate country and was promised to be treated on the basis 
of the same criteria applied to the 10 forthcoming MS in 1999 Helsinki Summit. The 
pre-accession strategy for Turkey has been adopted by the EU from 2000 onwards. In 
response, Turkey initiated the ‘National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis’ in 
2001. From 1998 onwards, regular reports on Turkey’s progress towards accession, the 
last of which – in 6 October 2004 – recommended the Council to start accession 
negotiations with Turkey, has been prepared by the Commission.  
 
As has been stated above, Turkey was obliged to fulfil political and economic 
criteria that had been agreed in 1993 Copenhagen Summit by EU MS in addition to the 
adoption of the Acquis Communautaire in order to become a full member of the EU. 
The Copenhagen Criteria requires the candidate country to have, first, stable institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities, second, a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the EU and third the ability to take on the 
obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and 
monetary union.52  
 
 The EU, therefore, became the primary catalyst in reforming Turkey, especially 
in the late 1990s. However, it should also be noted that the EU is not the only reason of 
the reformation process in Turkey but a triggering factor that fastens the process. In 
other words, being a full member of the Union is the post-modern version of ‘reaching 
the contemporary level of civilization’, as explained at the beginning of this chapter. 
The European states has transformed the ‘modern state’, the basis of which was founded 
in 1648-Westphalia; the state is less important and democracy and European norms are 
prior to security concerns. Through integration and pooling of sovereignty, the EU MS 
has less national sovereignty and therefore focuses less on the elements of the realist 
world.53 As a result, especially from 1987 onwards, the EU has been the major carrot 
for Turkey in transforming into a post-modern state.  
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As has been stated above, from 1998 onwards, regular reports not only on 
CEECs’ and  
Mediterranean countries’ but also on Turkey’s progress towards accession reports have 
started to be prepared by the European Commission. The purpose of the documents has 
been to outline the extent to which the candidate country accomplishes the fulfilment of 
the criteria for membership. Although the Commission’s reports are not binding, it has 
usually been the case that the Council follows the recommendations.54 In the case of 
Turkey, a significant improvement in the language used in the reports can be observed 
in an increasing fashion from 2001 onwards. 
 
 According to the 1998 regular report, Turkey fell very much short of the 
requirements of the EU in terms of Copenhagen political criteria. ‘Persistent human 
right violations’ and ‘major shortcomings in the treatment of minorities’ took the first 
place in the report. This was mostly due to the Turkey’s low human rights records and 
the guerrilla war that had been continuing in the South-East provinces of Turkey and in 
Northern Iraq against the terrorist organization PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party). 
Secondly, lack of civilian control and the strong influence of the Turkish Armed Forces 
over politics were also strongly underlined. 55  The reason for the emphasis was mainly 
because of the influence of the NSC and therefore the strong position of the military in 
politics. More specifically, the semi-memorandum by the army on 28 February 1997 
against the Islamist Welfare Party – RP (Refah Partisi) and the closure of party in a year 
attracted high level of attention from the Europeans. Therefore, Turkey’s prospect for 
membership was very low in 1998. It should also be noted that Turkey-EU relations 
were unilaterally frozen by Turkey due to the decisions of Luxembourg Summit in 1997 
– Agenda 2000 – as the EU left Turkey alone in the applicant list. 
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 In the 1999 report, the Commission asserts that Turkey-EU relations have not 
changed since 1998 as a result of the deadlock in the relations. Despite the importance 
of the ‘European Strategy’, which Turkey strongly rejected by freezing the relations, is 
emphasized, the capture of the terrorist leader Abdullah Öcalan constitutes a major area 
of attention in the report.56 Indeed, the report has no significance not only because the 
relations were in deadlock, but also because no significant measures in relations were 
taken in terms of progress during 1999. However, two months after the report, the 
European Council in Helsinki has recognized Turkey as a candidate country, which 
consequently changed both the EU-Turkey relations and the political environment in 
Turkey. 
 
 On 10-11 December 1999, the European Council decided in Helsinki that 
“Turkey 
is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as 
applied 
to the other candidate States”.57 However, it is asserted in the report that Turkey still did 
not meet the Copenhagen political criteria. In the 2001 report, the Commission 
appreciates the Constitutional amendments of 3 October 2001 that limited the capital 
punishment and strengthened the fundamental rights and liberties and human rights 
conditions. A number of positive elements are addressed in the report with respect to 
economic, social and cultural rights. However, it is also noted that human rights 
conditions must still be improved. Thus, although certain improvements in terms of 
reforms are praised, implementation of the reforms is still addressed as the biggest 
obstacle for membership.  
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 On 3 November 2002, Turkey went through general elections and the AKP came 
to power. As soon as it obtained the vote of confidence in the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly (TGNA), the party signified the EU membership as its primary goal in the 
agenda. For this reason, the leader of the party, Recep Tayyip Erdoan, visited almost 
all the major capitals of the EU MS and asked for support in the 2002 Copenhagen 
European Council. However, Turkey could not get what it expected, which was to begin 
accession negotiations. Instead, the EU promised to open accession negotiations 
‘without delay’ in the end of 2004, if the European Council in Brussels decides so, on 
the basis of the Commission’s recommendation that Turkey fulfilled Copenhagen 
criteria.58 Nevertheless, Turkey continued the reformation process, which is praised in 
the 2003 regular report. ‘Far reaching changes’ in Turkey’s political and legal system 
has been noted in addition to the will of Turkey to effectively implement the reforms are 
appreciated, although implementation is considered to be uneven. It is therefore 
concluded in the report that “Turkey has made further impressive legislative efforts 
which constitute significant progress towards achieving compliance with the 
Copenhagen political criteria”.59  
 
 Finally, in its 6 October 2004 report, the Commission recommends the Council 
to begin accession negotiations with Turkey. Although some areas, such as Turkish 
Penal Code, in Turkish legal system are highlighted as remaining defects, the 
Commission approves that Turkey had sufficiently fulfilled the Copenhagen economic 
and political criteria that is adequate to start accession negotiations. Consequently, the 
Brussels European Council has decided on 17 December to, on the basis of a report and 
recommendation from the Commission, open accession negotiations with Turkey 
without delay. Turkey, however, was required to “sign the Protocol regarding the 
adaptation of the Ankara Agreement, taking account of the accession of the ten new 
Member States...prior to the actual start of the negotiations”.60 In addition, Turkey was 
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held responsible for reforming the Penal code until 3 October 2005. Therefore, in her 42 
years of journey to the EU, Turkey finally achieved a concrete way to full membership.  
 
The 1982 Constitution of Turkish Republic, which was prepared under non-
democratic and authoritative conditions, has been amended to a great extent. The 
Turkish parliament has enacted eight reform packages since 2001. The reformation 
process covers ‘fundamental civil rights and liberties’, ‘political rights’, ‘the rule of 
law’, and ‘civil-military relations’.61 As has been stated above, the reforms have been 
directed towards fulfilling Copenhagen political criteria. Firstly, the extent of restriction 
of fundamental rights and liberties that had previously been enumerated under Article 
13 of the Constitution has been limited and the standards have been brought much 
closer to the Article 17 of the European Convention of Human Rights. Moreover, 
Article 26 and Article 176 on freedom of expression have also been liberalized. For the 
former, the phrase, ‘language prohibited by law’ has been deleted. The latter Article, in 
which ‘no protection shall be afforded to thoughts and opinions contrary to Turkish 
national interest, the indivisibility of the State with its territory and nation, Turkish 
historical and moral values; Atatürk’s nationalism, his principles, reforms, and 
modernism’, has been amended; the words, ‘thoughts and opinions’ has been changed 
by ‘activities’. Further, on 19 February 2002, Article 312, which used to punish 
“inciting people to hostility and hatred on the basis of the differences of social class, 
race, religion, sect and region”, has been amended by adding the condition of ‘criminal 
offence’ that such expressions should envisage. In addition, the amendment on Article 
159 of the Penal code has limited the scope of the offences towards the Republic, 
Turkishness, the Grand National Assembly, the military and security forces, and the 
moral personality of the judiciary, which previously foresaw a expression like 
‘insulting’ and enabled the state to have extensive, unnecessary control over its citizens 
and to execute on the basis of vague reasons.62 Furthermore, the death penalty has been 
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abolished and “conformity with the Sixth Additional Protocol to the European Union 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) was attained”.63 As Turkish Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdoan also dictated, a zero tolerance policy towards torture and ill-
treatment has been adopted. In addition to this, custody periods have been reduced to 24 
hours. Thus, according to the 2004 Council of Europe report and to the Committee of 
the Prevention of torture, Turkey has achieved considerable improvements in terms of 
prevention of torture and ill-treatment.64 With respect to the protection of minorities 
according to the Copenhagen Criteria, “the EU’s Accession Partnership document was 
circumspect as it did not specifically use the word Kurdish and restricted its 
requirements to cultural rights”.65 Thus, although Turkey has fallen short with the 
requirements, “teaching and broadcasting in ‘different languages and dialects 
traditionally used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives’, including but not restricted to 
Kurdish” has been allowed. In addition to this, right to build places of worship, “subject 
to the approval of competent administrative authorities” for non-Muslim minorities has 
been granted.66 Above all, in accordance with the Copenhagen criteria, Turkish law has 
been harmonized with EU standards to a great extent.  
 
 Lastly, the role of the military in Turkey has been one of the major areas of 
criticism by the EU. Because the military regarded itself as the guardian of the existing 
regime and secularism, its self-perceived duty of securing democracy through 
undemocratic ways has led to the never-ending intervention of the army in politics. In 
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addition, the military has achieved important prerogatives through the constitutions that 
were prepared in 1961, 1973 and in 1982 under its influence.67 In her Europeanization 
process, Turkey has gone through one of the most significant changes in her 
institutional and governmental structure. Thus, State Security Courts, which consisted 
of public prosecutors and military judges were completely civilianized in 1999 and 
totally abolished by 2004. The National Security Council (NSC), the duty of which had 
been to give advices according to 1961 constitution, to recommend according to the 
1973 amendments and the compulsory duty of the government to give priority to the 
recommendations of the NSC according to the 1982 constitution, has been re-regulated 
with the recent amendments in line with the EU standards. The number of the civilian 
members of the NSC has been increased in addition to the decline of the effects of the 
NSC’s decisions on the government. Further, ‘the advisory character of the NSC 
decisions has been explicitly underlined.’68 The Secretary General of the NSC today is 
no more a member of the military but a civilian and the decisions of the NSC are 
published in the Official Gazette in order to ensure transparency. The privilege of the 
army in terms of being subject to the judicial control of the Court of Accounts has been 
eliminated in 2003. Thus, the budget of the Turkish Armed Forces has been totally 
civilianized. Moreover, the military member of the Turkish Educational Board has been 
eliminated as well. Lastly, the privilege of certain expenditures, which used not to be 
subject to the judicial control of the Court of Accounts, has been abolished.69  
 
 As can be observed through the data above, Turkish democracy has gone 
through a major transformation by the EU carrot, if yet not totally be consolidated. First 
of all, the implementation of the amendments carries a crucial role in order to achieve 
the European standards in the post-modern order. On the other hand, what Turkey so far 
has done can be claimed to be a major accomplishment in terms of human rights, 
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political rights, rule of law, and of civil-military relations and relatively of protection of 
minorities. In addition, Turkey has stabilized its macro-economic situation as well. As a 
result of these positive developments, the EU, on 17 December 2004, based upon the 
Commission’s recommendation, has decided to open accession negotiations with 
Turkey. However, there also are some points, or issues, that Turkish democracy lack to 
conform to the European conception of democracy, which will be demonstrated below 
in accordance with the Commission’s report of 6 October 2004.  
 
 
 
III. The interpretation of the 17 December decisions and the negotiating 
framework 
 
 
 It is crucially important to note that the language in the Presidency Conclusions 
has been in such a way that one might observe the EU’s hesitancy in taking Turkey in. 
For the Europeans, this is totally because Turkey is a peculiar country in terms of her 
population, as she is the most populous country that will ever join the EU in the 
enlargement process. In other words, Turkey will be the most populous country after 
Germany in the EU when she becomes a member. In the framework for negotiations of 
the 17 December decisions, it has been stated that:  
 
The shared objective of the negotiations is accession. These negotiations are an 
open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand. 
While taking account of all Copenhagen criteria, if the candidate State is not in a 
position to assume in full all the obligations of membership it must be ensured that 
the candidate State concerned is fully anchored in the European structures through 
the strongest possible bond…In the case of a serious and persistent breach in a 
candidate State of the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law on which the Union is founded, the 
Commission will, on its own initiative or on the request of one third of the 
Member States, recommend the suspension of negotiations and propose the 
conditions for eventual resumption. The Council will decide by qualified majority 
on such a recommendation, after having heard the candidate State, whether to 
suspend the negotiations and on the conditions for their resumption. The Member 
States will act in the IGC in accordance with the Council decision, without 
prejudice to the general requirement for unanimity in the IGC. 70 
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As is stated above, the ultimate objective of the negotiations is accession. However, it is 
also stated that Turkey will be ‘fully anchored in the European structures through the 
strongest bond possible’, which leads one to interpret the phrase as privileged 
partnership. In other words, although the condition is based on the assumption of 
malfunctioning of the EU’s norms and principles in Turkey, Turkey is, implicitly 
offered privileged membership. This phrase is strengthened by the following statement, 
which is either with the Commission’s will, or with the request of one third of MS, the 
negotiations might be suspended. Thus, despite the fact that Turkey has been offered the 
opening of negotiations, serious reservations within the EU can be observed through the 
language used in the document. It is also worth to note that what has been stated in the 
framework is completely true as a matter of fact since this is the nature of the 
negotiations. In other words, the negotiations would automatically be suspended i.e. if 
Turkey violated human rights. The problem with the document therefore is there is no 
reason but the reluctance of the EU to repeatedly emphasize these factorial inputs in the 
document, which also have been more obviously outlined in the Negotiating Framework 
of 3 October. 
 
 With the initiative of the United Kingdom (UK) Presidency, the MS met on 2 
October 2005 to discuss the content of the negotiating framework for Turkey. There 
was again huge amount or resistance by the MS, specifically by Austria, the position of 
which on Turkey’s full membership has always been substantially against. Indeed, the 
reason d’etat of the Austrian state has been not to include Turkey in the European 
integration project but to leave her as an outsider. Although the discussions over the 
negotiating framework of 2-3 October is the foci of the next chapter, it should be noted 
that the Austrians got what they wanted by adding Croatia into the agenda, as President 
Fischer stated that Austria is satisfied with the negotiating framework.71 Thus, the 
Council included the phrase of ‘absorption capacity’ in the framework on 3 October, 
different than the previous framework for negotiations.  
 
It is strongly emphasized in the negotiating framework that there are other 
options than full-membership. As has been noted above, Turkey will be “fully anchored 
in the European structures through the strongest possible bond” if Turkey fails to meet 
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the obligations of membership, which is simply the Copenhagen criteria. It is crucially 
important to note that the Union’s ‘absorption capacity’ with respect to Turkish 
membership will be taken into consideration as it is addressed in the second paragraph 
of the negotiating framework. The ‘absorption capacity’ can be interpreted in two ways. 
Firstly, as has been stated by DG Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn72, the 
absorption capacity is existent in the Copenhagen criteria, which is to say absorption 
capacity of the EU is not a new condition for membership for Turkey but has always 
been a part of the criteria. In other words, absorption capacity refers to the Union’s 
eligibility ‘to reserve the right to decide when it will be ready to accept new 
members’.73 In contrast, no matter how Turkey tries to fulfil the obligations of 
membership through the adoption of the acquis communautaire during the negotiation 
processes, the Union, or precisely the Member States, might use the card of ‘absorption 
capacity’ by claiming that the EU has not yet achieved the necessary strength in order to 
absorb Turkey and veto the accession process. Either way or another, Commissioner 
Rehn seems to be right by stating that ‘the absorption capacity’ has always been in the 
Copenhagen Criteria; it is not a new thing that is only created for Turkey, specifically to 
create obstacles against Turkey’s probable future membership in the EU. In addition, 
according to the framework, any member state holds the right to veto and therefore 
suspend negotiations at any time, without any reason. However, the problem is the 
strength of the emphasis in the framework on the options other than full membership 
which do not exist in the frameworks for negotiations of the recently acceded 10 new 
member states.   
 
 One of the reasons why the IGC on 2-3 October lasted too long was because of 
Turkey’s yet unresolved dispute with one of the MS – the ‘Republic of Cyprus’. 
According to the 17 December decisions, Turkey had to fulfil two more duties that were 
firstly to implement six specific items of legislation within the Penal Code and secondly 
to sign the Protocol ‘regarding the adaptation of the Ankara Agreement, taking account 
of the accession of the ten new Member States’74 in order to start accession negotiations 
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with the EU. In other words, Turkey had been asked to widen the Ankara Agreement in 
order to have a CU with the ten new MS, which has been fulfilled in July 2005. 
However, Turkey additionally made a declaration that envisages signing the Additional 
Protocol does not mean to recognise Southern Cyprus as the ‘Republic of Cyprus’. In 
the Framework for Negotiations, “Turkey's continued support for efforts to achieve a 
comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework and in line 
with the principles on which the Union is founded, including steps to contribute to a 
favourable climate for a comprehensive settlement, and progress in the normalisation of 
bilateral relations between Turkey and all EU Member States, including the Republic of 
Cyprus” and “the fulfilment of Turkey's obligations under the Association Agreement 
and its Additional Protocol extending the Association Agreement to all new EU 
Member States, in particular those pertaining to the EU-Turkey customs union, as well 
as the implementation of the Accession Partnership, as regularly revised” are listed as 
requirements in the measurement of Turkey’s progress towards accession.75 
      
 In sum, Turkey’s EU membership is not yet certain. The negotiations, which 
have begun with the screening of one of the smoothest chapters, will toughen soon. In 
other words, when it comes to the chapter on Agriculture, for instance, neither Turkey 
nor the EU have formed a plausible idea on what will be the procedures like. On top of 
everything, as can also be observed through the above analysis, the hesitancy of certain 
member states, some of which are relatively more powerful, i.e. France and Germany, 
than others, might cause the ever closer relations to disrupt. As has been stated 
previously, the language that is adopted for the Turkish accession in the official 
documents, which is the reflection of the relative powers of member states and the result 
of convergence of their interests, is clearly visible when one considers the latest 
enlargement that is concluded. Therefore, although it is very hard and also unnecessary 
to make any further speculations, it might be claimed that beginning accession 
negotiations does not really mean finalizing Turkey’s desire to become a member of the 
EU.        
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
 
The Domestic-International Linkage and Member State Preferences: Germany, 
France, Great Britain and Austria 
 
 
This chapter addresses the EU governments’ and their leaders’ positions and 
preferences on Turkey’s accession to the EU. For that purpose, the speeches of leaders 
will be analysed through a discourse analysis method; more specifically, the 
government leaders’ preferences and positions will be analysed. The EU’s accession 
criteria are objective as has also been officially declared in Helsinki; Turkey’s EU bid 
will be evaluated on the basis of the same criteria that have been applied to the 
Mediterranean and Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). However, there 
are significant obstacles unique to Turkey, and an analysis of the EU leaders’ speeches 
enables us to claim that this is increasingly apparent since 17 December 2004.  
 
Accession negotiations and screening always begin at the same time and all 
negotiations are carried out by the Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) with the 
European Commission as mediator. Although the process will follow exactly the same 
procedures in the Turkish case, some leaders in certain Member States insist on the fact 
Turkey’s EU bid is dependent upon the outcome of IGCs, where every MS has one 
single vote due to the principle of unanimity. Therefore, the Turkish enlargement will 
be no different than the previous enlargements; the single difference is in the discourse 
that is repeatedly used by opinion and political leaders in EU Member States, which 
explicitly emphasizes factorial inputs as special conditions for Turkey. This thesis 
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argues that political and opinion leaders’ preferences and positions determine the 
conditions under which Turkey will become a member or not to the EU.       
 
In this chapter, the discourse analysis will cover leaders’ speeches in Germany, 
France and the United Kingdom (UK), as the three countries are the most powerful 
actors in the EU decision making processes; and in Austria, where the highest level of 
opposition exists. On top of Andrew Moravcsik’s Liberal Intergovernmentalism Theory 
(LI), Robert Putnam’s two-level game, which covers domestic politics and international 
relations linkages, will constitute the theoretical framework of this chapter since 
domestic positions at home determine government policies and consequently their 
preferences at the EU bargaining level.76 Therefore, a government which has significant 
political opposition to Turkish membership to the EU among its public, such as Austria 
does not have a long list of alternatives but to resist Turkey’s EU bid. Public opinion in 
the EU will be analysed in detail in the next chapter. However, in this chapter, 
governments’ preferences, which reflect publics’ positions, are spelled out.   
 
I. Domestic Politics and International Relations: Putnam and Moravcsik 
 
 Robert Putnam has opened a new page in international relations (IR) with his 
distinguished piece of work – Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-
Level Games – in 1988.77 For our purposes in this thesis, Putnam’s way of theorizing IR 
is crucially important since, in this dissertation, it is asserted that domestic politics and 
consequently public opinion play a huge amount of role in shaping EU-Turkey 
relations. In other words, Putnam provides the necessary background for this 
dissertation as the two-level game analysis enables us to understand the empirical data, 
which is given below. 
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As has also been discussed in Chapter I, domestic politics in member states play 
a very important role in shaping EU decision making processes as win-sets are crucial 
determinants in governments’ willingness for agreement or compromise. Before giving 
the win-set analysis, a brief summary of Putnam’s theory will be essential. In brief, 
according to Putnam, international agreements are possible only when “a powerful 
minority within each government actually favoured on domestic grounds the policy 
being demanded internationally”.78 In addition to this, international pressure is 
necessary in order to push for the policy shifts; within each country, there is a 
considerable amount of interest groups that favour certain policy shifts. Likewise, 
“without domestic resonance, international forces would not have sufficed to produce 
the accord, no matter how balanced and intellectually persuasive the overall package … 
Neither a purely domestic nor a purely int’l analysis could account for this episode”.79 
For our purposes, this assumption is critically important since the theoretical framework 
of this thesis is constructed upon the synthesis of Liberal Intergovernmentalism. In other 
words, it gives us further credibility to assume governments’ relative powers as 
important determinants in agreements in the EU. 
 
Whether ‘state strength’ has to be considered as the key element in the analysis of 
domestic politics – IR linkage or not is still debatable. Although Putnam asserts that the 
state-centric literature remains uncertain on theorizing the linkage between domestic 
politics and diplomacy, for our purposes, because certain – powerful – member states in 
the EU decision making processes have more impacts on policy making than other MS, 
state strength can still be considered as an important element in the analyses of Turkey-
EU relations. The support of the German and British governments for Turkey during the 
General Affairs and External Relations IGC on 3 October has been incredibly important 
in the formation of the negotiation framework. In other words, the outcome of the 
framework for negotiations for Turkey would have been much harsher than it is as 
Austria had pushed for more seriously harsher conditions but was opposed by the UK. 
Politics, indeed, should be considered as the domestic determinants of foreign policy 
and international relations: “social classes, interest groups (both economic and non-
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economic), legislators and even public opinion and elections, not simply executive 
officials and institutional arrangements.”80 Therefore, it should also be mentioned that  
 
at the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to 
adopt favourable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among 
those. At the int’l level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy 
domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments.81  
 
Lastly, the logic of two-level game enables one to assume the importance of the 
win-sets in EU decision making processes. The chief negotiator’s preferences in 
international bargaining are determined by his strong/weak positions in domestic 
politics. In other words, he/she “seeks simply to achieve an agreement that will be 
attractive to his constituents”. Putnam identifies Level I as “bargaining between the 
negotiators, leading to a tentative agreement, and Level II as “separate discussions 
within each group of constituents about whether to ratify the agreement”.82 Thus, the 
power and preferences of the major actors at Level II are important determinants of the 
outcomes of bargaining. In addition, the possibility of “no-agreement” and the “fear of 
losing the agreement entirely” as an outcome is also a powerful determinant in reaching 
a compromise because less favourable outcomes might be much better than the failure 
of an agreement, when one takes win-sets into consideration. Thus, a decision has been 
reached on 3 October IGC since the agreed negotiating framework was acceptable by all 
EU member states and by Turkey. In other words, the Austrian government had 
Croatian accession negotiations and the phrase of “absorption capacity”, the Turkish 
government ensured the Article on Cyprus dispute would not mean recognition and the 
UK had achieved her goal of enlarging in the negotiating framework. Above all, Putnam 
provides a perfect analytical framework for this chapter, in which it will be assumed 
that the two-level game is a huge determinant in the formation of policies within the EU 
and between Turkey and the EU.        
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II. Member State Preferences on Turkey’s EU bid: Leaders’ rhetorical actions 
 
The issue of Turkish membership is a source of political contention in some 
Member States such as France, Germany, and Austria. There is a considerable amount 
of hesitancy against Turkey’s membership in the EU in certain member states. As has 
already been covered in the previous chapters of this dissertation, some member states 
that are relatively more powerful, specifically France, Germany and the United 
Kingdom, have significantly more bargaining power in the decision making processes – 
or at the bargaining level. As opposed to the UK’s strong support for Turkey’s EU bid, 
leaders in France and some in Germany have drawn on Turkey as a major source of 
propaganda in their domestic politics. This is much more obvious in Austria as the level 
of opposition for Turkey’s membership to the EU is the highest among MS, and as 
Austria uses this endorsement in bargaining at the EU level. It can also be observed in 
the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty (CT) in France in the end of May 2005 and 
call for early elections in mid September in Germany. Leaders in both countries utilized 
Turkey’s EU bid; Turkey’s ‘non-European’ and ‘Islamic’ identity, its population, size 
and geography on top of the issues such as the Cyprus dispute and the so called 
Armenian genocide, as an instrument of remaining in or gaining power. However, 
basing the argument on the developments in these member states, it can be asserted that 
leaders failed in their goals by using Turkey in domestic politics; in the Euro-barometer 
post-referendum surveys Turkey’s EU membership constituted very small percentages 
among the reasons of why people said ‘no’ to the CT in France and in the Netherlands,83 
and when the CDU-CSU coalition of Angela Merkel and Edmund Stoiber, for whom 
Turkey has been a major element of propaganda in the election campaigns, 
unexpectedly failed to win the elections.   
 
Public opinion in the EU Member States – for our purposes, France, Germany, 
the UK and Austria, is still very much against Turkish membership in the EU. 
Differences between Turkishness and the European identity play a very important, 
though implicit role in the formation of this opposition. This particular element of 
opposition can be overcome through time and by strong civil society dialogue within 
and together with Member States and Turkey, which would help to eliminate the lack of 
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understanding among publics and to familiarize the cultures. Turkey’s population is 
another element of contention as it will be the second largest population in the EU if 
Turkey becomes a member. Economic backwardness of such a populated country is also 
obviously the source of economic reservations. Thus, neither the Cyprus dispute, nor the 
clash of discourses over what has happened between the Turks and the Armenians in 
1915 can be claimed to be strong elements among the reasons for opposition among 
public. However, leaders’ rhetorical actions, which are basically their public speeches 
and ideas expressed through media channel, constitute a very important element in the 
formation of public opinion. This is the reason why this chapter analyzes the rhetoric 
that certain political leaders use for domestic political purposes. In terms of 
methodology, the government leaders’ treatment of Turkey as a source to boost their 
popularity will be analysed through news that appears in the media; via public and the 
official speeches and through particular party programmes.84 These are important 
because they shape and determine public opinion. Firstly, government leaders’ public 
speeches in Germany, France, the UK and Austria after 17 December 2004 till 3 
October 2005 will be given in detail as the statements that had repeatedly been made 
have been extremely anti-Turkish accession. Secondly, the rhetoric that the leaders 
accommodate themselves into after 3 October will be analysed as it will be assumed 
that there is a certain amount of change and softening in the level of opposition in their 
speeches regarding Turkey. It will also be born in mind that the time period of both the 
Turkish accession and the leaders’ weakening in their positions coincidentally overlap. 
Thirdly and lastly, the position of the Commission with respect to the Turkish accession 
process will be given and the picture of the differences in rhetoric within the EU will be 
endeavoured to be drawn. In addition, some other MS’ leaders’ and some Commission 
officials’ opinions on particular issues will be given hand in hand with the analysis that 
is mentioned above.  
 
It is also worth to note that this chapter will endeavour to draw a picture of 
differences in the rhetorical actions during election propagandas and when leaders come 
to power. For example, the German elections of 18 September 2005 could be used to 
further illustrate this proposition. The data will cover Chancellor Angela Merkel’s 
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rhetoric before and after the German elections of 18 September, as Merkel won the 
elections with a very slight difference with former German Chancellor Gerhard 
Schroeder’s SPD as opposed to the expectations of the Christian Democrats, and 3 
October, as this date is one of the major turning points in the history of EU-Turkey 
relations. Hence, does rhetoric become policy is one question; whether this kind of 
rhetoric enables the leaders to reach their goals is another. Thus, the purpose of this 
chapter is to illustrate the extent to which Turkish accession has become part of the 
agendas of the political leadership in the EU Member States.  
 
 
III. The leaders and their stances on Turkey’s accession 
 
The hesitancy of MS concerning Turkish accession has been discussed in great 
depth and detail in the previous chapter. The language that has been adopted in the 
official documents, especially in the most recent one – the negotiation framework for 
Turkey –, perfectly demonstrates the impact of relative powers of MS in the bargaining 
process. In other words, certain emphases over the hardships and constraints over 
Turkey’s probable EU membership in every particular mean are adopted by the EU due 
to the fact that certain MS governments, most of which can be considered amongst the 
most powerful of all, i.e. France and Germany, force the EU decision making in order to 
satisfy their domestic political power. 
Hence, it would not be wrong to suggest that the rhetoric, into which opinion/political 
leaders accommodate themselves, is highly correlated with the formation of public 
opinion or with the outcomes of the decision making processes within the EU. 
 
 Angela Merkel, who is the current Chancellor and the leader of Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU) in Germany and Nicolas Sarkozy, who is the current Minister 
of Interior Affairs and the leader of Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP) – 
Union for a Popular Movement, in France, strongly oppose Turkish membership. Both 
leaders are very strong in their positions, which ultimately would lead one to assume 
that the rhetoric they use can either turn into policies or determine the public opinion on 
certain subject matters to a considerable extent. Although the positions of both has been 
damaged through the failure in the elections for the former and the recent spread of the 
discontent between the French police and the immigrants in the banlieue areas to all 
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over Paris and other towns for the latter, the rhetoric the leaders use is significantly 
important.85 Above all, the preferences and positions of government leaders in 
Germany, France, the UK, and Austria with respect to Turkey’s EU bid will be analysed 
below consecutively. 
 
 
Germany 
 
 German politics constitute an interesting example for Turkey’s accession bid. 
Currently, there is a considerable divide between the Right and Left in Germany over 
Turkish accession. This is reflected in the party programmes and the party leaders’ 
speeches. The mainstream in German politics is composed of two mainstream parties: 
The Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) on the centre-left and Christian 
Democratic Union – Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) on the right, both of which 
usually form a single party group in the Bundestag. The Green Party for the former and 
the Free Democratic Party for the latter usually function as the coalition partners of the 
mainstream political parties. In the aftermath of the German elections of 18 September, 
the conservative Christian Democrats and the centre-left Social Democrats has formed a 
coalition government – ‘the grand coalition’.86 The coalition partners have agreed on a 
‘coalition agreement’ and Angela Merkel has been elected as the Chancellor in the 
parliamentary vote on 22 November.87  
 
The agreement foresees mainly economic reforms in order to overcome the 
economic hardships such as almost 11 million unemployment level and very low rate of 
growth. For our concerns in this chapter, despite the fact that the Minister of Foreign 
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affairs – Frank-Walter Steinmeier – is a Social Democrat, there are certain changes in 
German foreign policy that are worth observing. First of all, Germany will follow a 
more pro-American-transatlantic policy as opposed to the previous governments’ Euro-
determinist policies. In other words, promoting transatlantic relations, which has gone 
through a crisis in the aftermath of the Iraq War due to divergence of the positions, 
approaches and interests, is one of the priorities of the current German government. On 
the other hand, the coalition agreement is very much in favour European integration as 
it sees the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty in the near future as indispensable.88 
Thirdly, there is a significant emphasis on an ambitious and differentiated EU 
Neighbourhood Policy.  
 
Regarding Turkey’s EU bid, it can be claimed that CDU inserted her 
longstanding position on Turkey. In other words, Germany, according to the coalition 
agreement, is in favour of a ‘privileged partnership’ for Turkey. For CDU, as has been 
discussed in depth in the previous chapters, Turkey’s full-membership would harm the 
European integration process and therefore Turkey should be a privileged partner of the 
EU instead of a full-member. According to the Agreement, “Germany has a particular 
interest in a deepening of mutual relations with Turkey and in binding the country to the 
EU”. In addition, there is an emphasis over the ‘open-ended’ nature of Turkish 
accession process; the process will not automatically lead to membership and “the 
outcome cannot be guaranteed at the outset”. More specifically, economic, demographic 
and cultural challenges that Turkey would pose are taken as serious matters of danger. 
Hence, with respect to the Turkish accession, the views of the grand coalition are 
accurate: “should the EU not have the capacity to absorb Turkey, or should Turkey not 
be able to comply completely and in full with all of the commitments which 
membership entails, Turkey must be linked to the European structures as closely as 
possible and in a way that further develops its privileged relationship with the EU”. 89 
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Meanwhile, the previous government of Germany, the SPD-Green coalition, had 
been very supportive of Turkey’s EU bid. The former Chancellor of Germany and the 
former leader of SPD had been one of the champions of Turkey’s accession bid during 
his leadership. Likewise, the coalition partner of the former government, the Greens’ 
and mainly the former Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer’s contribution to Turkey’s 
accession to the EU should not be underestimated. Fischer, who has continuously 
supported the Turks on their path to membership, claimed it would be a loss of sight to 
say ‘no’ to Turkey and who knew that Turkey is already a privileged partner of the EU 
in a parliamentary discussion in the Bundestag as opposed to Angela Merkel, who has 
been strongly insistent on the concept of ‘privileged partnership’, which is the ‘third 
way’, instead of full membership. Merkel also stated, privileged partnership is for the 
benefit of both parties – the EU and Turkey – and the CDU will put pressure in order to 
impose this concept as policy when it comes to power.90 Moreover, Fischer said in the 
aftermath of 3 October that  
 
Europe is the winner today. What has been promised for decades is now entering 
its decisive phase, which will last a long time... By that time, many fears will have 
been overcome... The eastern Mediterranean will be crucial for peace in the 21st 
century, not only for Turkey, not only for the region, but for Europe as a whole91         
 
Above all, without making any emphases over the question of Turkey’s European 
identity, Fischer and Schroeder had been strong supporters of Turkey. In other words, 
for the two previous leaders, what had to matter was Turkey’s progress in terms of the 
issues that the European Commission addressed. Schroeder went further by calling 
Turkey’s prospective membership to the EU “a blessing” addressing the fact that saying 
no to Turkey would trigger “the old nationalism and conflicts”.92  
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Even Schroeder and Fischer had not been as enthusiastic as they were with the 
previous enlargement.93 For the former, enlargement towards the CEECs was politically 
and morally necessary and defined it as “a requirement of historical justice”; and 
Europe would “become a continent of uncertainty” unless the EU enlarges for the 
latter.94 In other words, the kinship based duty, which does not exist for Turkey, was the 
core reason of the last enlargement. Nevertheless, both leaders had been very much 
supportive of Turkish membership especially after 2003 when the ten prospective 
member states agreed to become members in 2004. Schroeder strongly opposed any 
other conception but full-membership of Turkey to the EU. Further, in a meeting with 
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan, he confirmed his longstanding support 
by saying that the goal is Turkey’s full-membership but nothing; for him, Turkey and 
Europe should overcome the suspicions and fears about Turkey’s EU membership 
together.95 It is also worth to note that today, the successor of Schroeder, Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier is the Foreign Minister and the leader of SPD, in the grand-coalition of 
Germany today. Steinmeier, who helped to shape Schroeder’s Europe policy, has been 
very close to the former Chancellor. Thus, it would not be wrong to expect any clear 
changes in German foreign policy as the Foreign Minister will be supportive of 
Turkey’s EU bid as opposed to his coalition partners – CDU/CSU. In other words, 
although Turkey will remain as an issue of disagreement between the coalition partners 
in Germany, the influence of the SPD wing of the coalition that is led by Steinmeier on 
Turkey’s accession bid can be foreseen. Steinmeier follows the rhetoric of the previous 
government; for him, “the accession talks have started, so at least we (the EU) don't 
have to discuss if Turkey should join any longer”96 which derives one to assume he 
rejects the conception of privileged partnership anyhow.            
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 Above all, in line with its strong position and interests on transatlantic relations, 
there is great likelihood that Merkel in Germany will focus on the security identity of 
Turkey especially through signifying the importance of NATO and via declaring Turkey 
as a very important strategic partner.97 The emphases such as the EU’s absorption 
capacity, possible disruption of the Turkish governments’ and Turkey’s commitment to 
the EU and EU norms, and the open-endedness of the accession process has also been 
reflected in official EU documents and agreements. Thus, it would not be wrong to 
assume that Merkel’s preferences, backed by France and Austria and some other MS 
that have reservations concerning Turkey’s full-membership in the EU, has been 
effective in EU decision making in the bargaining process. In other words, the relative 
power of the German government and her leader’s preferences has led the EU to 
strongly adopt a hesitant language, which has been demonstrated in the previous 
chapter, towards Turkey’s EU bid. 
 
 As has been stated above, Angela Merkel has been very much against Turkish 
full-membership to the EU; what she offered instead has been the status of ‘privileged 
partnership’, according to which strong ties between Turkey and the EU would be 
established while Turkey would not participate in the decision making mechanism. 
However, the discourse that Merkel adopts should be divided into two: rhetoric before 
and after 3 October. Although there is no divergence of preferences in between the two 
periods, the language that has been used significantly differs in terms of content and the 
words used. 
 
 First and foremost, the position of CDU/CSU partnership is clear on Turkey’s 
accession bid; both political parties are for a different sort of partnership – namely 
‘privileged partnership’ – between Turkey and the EU. There are various reasons for 
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their firm position on Turkish EU membership, which can also be observed in 
‘Principles and Programme of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany’. 98  In other 
words, the principles of the Christian Democrats ultimately drive them into opposing 
Turkey in the EU as a matter of values and principles. In the programme, there is high 
level of emphasis over Europe’s and Germany’s Christian identity. A couple of 
quotations would be enough to suggest that it is very hard for the Christian Democrats 
to support Turkey’s accession bid as a matter of fact. According to the Programme, the 
Christian Democrats’ “policies are based on the Christian view of Man and his 
responsibility before God”.99 The Christian Democrats define themselves as a social, 
liberal and conservative party, and the basic values of the policies are listed as freedom, 
solidarity and justice. “The CDU has a particular commitment to preserve and 
strengthen the Christian values” of democracy as well.100  Moreover, the Christian 
Democrats views on the EU are as follows: 
 
The task of further developing European Union, ensuring lasting freedom in 
Europe and strengthening the new democracies offers an opportunity for creating a 
common European future. For Germany, located as it is at very heart of Europe, 
this is a particularly important challenge101 
 
It can be claimed that Turkey has no place in Christian Democratic definition of 
Europe either because of other sources of discourse that are adopted by them or 
because ‘strengthening new democracies’ refers to the CEECs, which started to 
experience democracy in the aftermath of the end of the Cold-War. Further, 
according to the Programme, Europe has special obligations towards the Central, 
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, where Turkey has no place again since it is 
stated that EU membership will provide “access for them to Western security 
structures, the Western European Union and NATO”, of which Turkey has been a 
participant for decades.102 Lastly, European identity according to the Programme 
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is “based on common cultural roots and common destiny of the people”.103 
Hence, above all, Christian Democratic values and principles, some of which has 
been addressed above, are not compatible with the idea of having Turkey in the 
EU as a full-member. 
 
 Angela Merkel has adopted a similar rhetoric with the CDU party 
programme during her election campaign and before she came to office. In her 
speeches that have appeared in the media, she explicitly opposed Turkey’s EU 
membership. To some extent, as has also been stated before, she opposed Turkish 
accession to boost her popularity among German’s who are against Turkey’s EU 
bid. In June 2005, Merkel claimed that Turkey would harm the European 
integration process and “Europe should not deal with everything and everyone”. 
On top of this, according to Merkel, democracy cannot exist without the roots of 
Christian thought.104 
 
 Turkey’s stance considering the conception of ‘privileged partnership’ has 
been very firm from the very beginning. Merkel rejects the accusations among the 
Turkish side that claim she sees the EU as a ‘club of Christians’ and asserts that 
the very reason why she opposes Turkish accession is because of the last 
enlargement.105 Further, “blocking Turkey's hopes of eventual full membership in 
the EU” and pressing the EU government leaders to offer the status of ‘privileged 
partnership’ has been Merkel’s propaganda element in the election campaigns 
before 18 September 2005. 
 
 Moreover, according to the Turkish media, Merkel sent a letter to the EU 
government leaders in August 2005 that warned them about Turkey’s prospective 
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membership. In the letter, it had been stated that Turkish membership would endanger 
European integration economically, politically and socially.106 Merkel’s position on 
Turkish accession was as hard as it could be. In other words, Merkel explicitly 
denounced her reservations against Turkish accession during her propaganda campaign. 
According to Le Figaro, the German right ‘has been targeting strengthening relations 
with Nicolas Sarkozy’ in order to prevent probable Turkish accessions as Merkel was 
the 'would be' Chancellor and Sarkozy, the French President.107 Thus, interestingly, 
German Right and French Right might have a coalition over Turkey.   
 
However, in her recent public speeches, there is a considerable amount of 
softening in the language. Although Merkel emphasized the differences between 
Turkish and European cultures in her campaign, it can be claimed that she carried her 
reasons for opposition to the EU level. In other words, there is a slight difference in the 
rhetoric she uses; instead of stating that Turkey is far different than the EU in various 
aspects, she connotes much more superficial explanations for opposition such as the 
EU’s absorption capacity. In her speech to the parliament on 1 December, Merkel stated 
that the accession negotiation process is an open-ended process and there is no 
guarantee to the decision that will be made at the end of it. Although she highlighted her 
established terminology – ‘privileged partnership’, the causes of the outcomes has been 
listed as the EU’s absorption capacity or Turkey’s failure in her commitments and in 
adapting EU laws and practices.108 Thus, although privileged partnership remains in the 
agenda, there is certain amount of reduction in the anti-Turkey sentiments.  
  
Furthermore, after 3 October, although she has similar views on Turkish 
accession, namely privileged partnership, she somewhat stopped pronouncing the 
phrase repeatedly. In the press conference following the meeting with grand coalition 
partners on 12 November, instead of the words ‘privileged partnership’, she stated that 
Germany wants close relations with Turkey. In addition, the coalition partners asserted 
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that one should take two elements into consideration in the case of Turkish accession: 
the absorption capacity of the EU and the Copenhagen criteria.109 Although the content 
of the new words does not imply a different and a more positive meaning, it would not 
be wrong to suggest that changing or reforming the very longstanding element of 
propaganda might either mean a foreseeable change in the forthcoming policies or at 
least the end of triggering anti-Turkey sentiments in the public.    Hence, again the EU 
level explanations are listed as obstacles for membership rather than accommodating 
Germany into the old rhetoric, which basically signifies Turkey’s huge Muslim 
population or the Turks ‘non-western’ identity. 
  
Hence, there is a change in the CDU position once they come to power. For 
instance, according to the Turkish official declarations, in the meetings with Merkel and 
Steinmeier on 18 November, none of the leaders ever spoke of ‘privileged 
partnership’.110 According to Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül, the meetings 
were long and constructive; Turkish-German relations will be as same as it was with the 
previous government. Gül also stated that there is no point of thinking other means but 
accession as the negotiations has started. For him, the most important matter is not to 
deadlock the accession negotiations and for this very reason Merkel will find 
alternatives other than privileged partnership. Gül also mentioned the significance of 
Europe’s soft power and its huge impacts on the world.111 Lastly, in the meetings, on 
top of good relations with Turkey, for Merkel cooperation with Turkey is very 
important as both countries have been cooperating as they are members of NATO.112 
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Moreover, in the meeting with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan, Merkel 
stated that Germany would keep her promises and “everything was going as 
intended”.113  Thus, as one of her ultimate objectives in foreign policy is improving 
transatlantic ties, Merkel stresses Turkey’s strategic significance for Germany.114 Above 
all, Turkish government officially declared that it believes in the good will of the 
German government as opposed to the previous reservations about today’s government 
before 3 October. 
 
Lastly, in her policy statement to the Bundestag, Chancellor Merkel has linked 
public opinion and enlargement by stating “without the support and trust of its citizens 
Europe is unthinkable...which also means that we cannot overload the EU's capacity to 
admit new members”.115 She repeated her post 3 October rhetoric that negotiations with 
Turkey was an open-ended process and not automatic, “whose outcome cannot be 
guaranteed from the outset”, which had been stated in the coalition agreement as well. 
In June 2005, Merkel declared that the CDU will “keep pursuing” the ideal of 
‘privileged partnership’ “in future negotiations” although they were “bound by signed 
treaties”.116 However, as opposed to her precious statement, after she met with Turkish 
Prime Minister Erdoan, Merkel stated that Turkey and Germany “will walk hand in 
hand as always” reassuring the principle “pacta sund servanda (Latin for agreements 
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must be respected) applies”.117 Thus, as can be observed above, Merkel, today, adopts a 
much softer tone in her speeches as such.  
 
Above all, the language that Merkel uses with respect to the Germany-Turkey-
EU triangle after 3 October decisions has significantly softened. Although Merkel is 
much more careful in the words she uses after 3 October and after she became the 
Chancellor, she nevertheless does not hesitate to use anti-Turkey sentiments in her 
speeches. In an Austrian TV channel, she praised Austria for insisting on the enactment 
of the phrase ‘absorption capacity’ and claimed that this type of an attitude increased 
EU’s integration power.118  As has been stated above, rather than the content of her 
speeches, the phrases in her rhetoric and the previously rough tone she insisted on has 
significantly changed. Whether this softening in the language as opposed to the 
remaining anti-Turkish accession content in the current German government will reflect 
into the policies or not remains to be seen. It is also worth to state that a considerable 
softening in German policies toward Turkey is expected as the Foreign Minister – 
Steinmeier – of the Grand Coalition is a SPD, which partially assures that there won’t 
be a significant divergence of positions and preferences.   
 
 
France 
 
Recently, France has gone through a series of hostile demonstrations, the 
outcome of which is increasing societal tensions and the cost of millions of Euros. The 
problem of (mainly Muslim) immigrants versus ethnic French/French government 
clashes can be claimed to be the one of the biggest future problems for France. On top 
of everything, high unemployment and economic stagnation that triggers the tension are 
also existent in France. Therefore, in addition to the economic hardships, France has a 
relatively discontent and disintegrated Muslim and African immigrant population of 
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five million, which is influential, both in the formation of public opinion and in decision 
making.  
 
Up until his defeat in French regional elections when 20 regions out of 22 chose 
the opposition – the left, President Jacques Chirac was a strong defender of Turkey’s 
accession in the EU. However, when the charismatic Nicolas Sarkozy replaced the 
(former) head of UMP – Alain Juppe – and started to shake Gaullist Chirac’s power, 
Chirac has gone through a major change in his rhetoric.119 Hence, the French case 
should be analysed in three steps. Firstly, Chirac’s previous support for Turkey’s EU 
bid will be given. Secondly, President Chirac’s post- (EU Constitution) referendum 
speeches and declarations will be analysed. It should also be noted that while Chirac is 
the most important actor in French politics for our purposes, the speeches of political 
leaders, who are under his influence will also be addressed. Lastly and finally, the 
rhetoric of Sarkozy will be the focus as he can be considered as the would-be President 
after 2007. It is also worth to note that, opinion leaders like Valerie Giscard D’Estaing 
are also influential in the formation of public opinion.    
  
First and foremost, the position of Jacques Chirac in French politics is not very 
strong. In other words, he not only suffered a defeat in the regional elections in March 
2004 but the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty weakened Chirac’s position. Just 
before the EU Summit of 17 December, the French President declared in his speech in 
the French television that it would be a great risk to say non to Turkey since Turkey had 
applied for membership in 1963. For him any other suggestion for Turley, such as 
‘privileged partnership’ cannot be accepted. On top of everything, Chirac underlined the 
fact that Turkey will be a much more different country in a more positive fashion in 
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terms of European way of life and understanding of human rights in 10-15 years time.120 
Moreover, right after the 17 December Summit, Chirac declared that he believed in the 
marriage of Turkey and the EU, although the path for this is long and difficult. He 
further stated that he appreciated and saluted the Turkish government due to its efforts 
in adopting the necessary reforms.121  
 
Furthermore, Jacques Chirac is not only weak with respect to his constituents, 
but also within his own party’s dynamics. In other words, even his allies in the UMP 
have been very critical on his support for Turkey. In June 2004, the General Secretary 
of UMP – François Baroin – stated that they might say ‘yes’ to the limited enlargement 
towards Bulgaria and Romania but the Turkey has to wait as she already is in 
cooperation with the EU. Similarly, the (former) Chair of the party – Alain Juppe – 
proposed to have special partnership with Turkey.122 Therefore, Chirac, with respect to 
Turkey’s EU bid, has been left alone and consequently he had all the necessary means, 
such as remaining in power, to oppose Turkish membership to the EU. Moreover, 
according to a Swiss newspaper, the former Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin, who is 
known with his loyalty to Chirac, stated in late 2004 that the problem was not the 
Turkish government but the Turkish public itself. “Do you want Islam to invade the 
heart of secularism” he continues.123 Furthermore, French Right and Left have no clear 
position on the issue of Turkey’s prospective membership to the EU. In other words, 
both the socialists and the UMP had divisions among/within their parties. What they 
wanted was to have a parliamentary discussion in the Assembly, which did not take 
place. The former Socialist Prime Minister Laurent Fabius stated that he did not share 
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the same position with the Commission because taking Turkey in is a matter of 
European construction, as he believed “Turkey is not in Europe”.124 Likewise, a deputy 
from the UMP, Dominique Paille, stated that an obvious disagreement between Chirac’s 
and their opinions on the issue existed.125 Lastly, 12 parliamentarians sent a letter to the 
President, according to which “Turkey’s entrance to the EU is a very dangerous project 
and even a commitment of suicide for federal Europe”.126 Above all, these are very 
strong statements as opposed to Chirac’s firm support for Turkey’s EU membership. 
 
As has been stated earlier in this chapter, the rejection of the Constitutional 
Treaty on top of the UMP’s defeat in regional elections affected very much of already 
distorted position of Chirac and the discourse he previously adopted. After the referenda 
in France and Germany in 29 May and 1 June 2005, the discussion on the EU’s future 
has increased to a considerable extent. After the Brussels Summit in June 2005, while 
Romania and Bulgaria had been assured of their membership to the EU, President 
Chirac underlined the fact that the EU Constitution would enable the enlarged EU work 
better. “In this new situation, can the EU continue to expand without us having the 
institutions needed to make this enlarged EU work effectively?” he asked which can be 
claimed to be a reference to Turkey’s prospective accession starting in a couple of 
months.127 
 
Chirac, nevertheless, followed a considerably balanced path in altering his 
rhetoric. In other words, it was indispensable for him to decrease the level of support for 
Turkey’s EU bid at home and at the EU level due to the criticisms by the opposition 
parties and by the opposition within his party and his constituents and to the very low 
support for Turkey’s membership to the EU among the Frenchmen and women. From 
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the very beginning, the French President had always been in favour of Turkey’s EU 
membership, while stressing the facts such as the process will take at least take 10-15 
years and neither Turkey nor the EU will be the same. In addition to this, he 
continuously addressed that the outcome of negotiations does not have to be full-
membership; Turkey and the EU might end up with different solutions and conclusions. 
His major element of propaganda in his resistance against the anti-Turkey opposition 
has been the fact that the French public will vote on Turkey’s membership to the EU in 
the referendum when the time comes. Hence, Chirac’s rhetoric has been more different 
than Schroeder, who has been one of the champions of Turkey’s EU bid, and Merkel, 
who had constantly opposed Turkey’s full membership in the EU up until the 3 October 
decisions. In other words, Chirac neither could treat Turkey as a propaganda element 
due to his unavoidable fortune in domestic politics, nor had the necessary support from 
and among his constituents. He followed a “yes; but/if” policy on Turkey’s membership 
to the EU. For Chirac, Turkey belongs to Europe and ‘privileged partnership’ is 
unacceptable. However, Turkey will become a member of the EU if and only if she 
fulfils the necessary criteria for membership and if the French public says ‘yes’ for 
Turkey in the future referendum.128      
 
Chirac’s statements with respect to Turkish accession have been strengthened 
with respect to feeding anti-Turkey sentiments, which can be considered as a political 
struggle by him. As has been stated above, the issues of Cyprus, the so called 
‘Armenian genocide’, or Turkey’s shortcomings in human rights should only be 
considered as minor obstacles in front of Turkey’s EU bid and do not constitute 
critically important places among the European publics’ reservations with reference to 
Turkey. Nevertheless, these issues are treated by political leaders of EU member state 
governments as political assets in negotiations between Turkey and the EU. The 
strongest amongst these issues can be claimed to be the Cyprus dispute as the ‘Republic 
of Cyprus’ is not recognised by Turkey on the Turkish part and the island is invaded by 
Turkish Armed Forces according to the Greek Cypriot part. The French Foreign 
Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy stated in August 2005 that the Cyprus dispute should be 
discussed within the EU with all its respects and not recognizing one of the members of 
the EU is unacceptable. On top of this, the French Prime Minister Dominique de 
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Villepin asserted that Turkey’s membership to the EU is unthinkable if Turkey does not 
recognize the ‘Republic of Cyprus’.129 Moreover, Chirac, repeating what his Prime 
Minister and Foreign Minister had said, stated that “opening accession negotiations with 
a country, which does not recognize one of the members of the Union, is 
unthinkable”.130 The difference in Chirac’s rhetoric has also been noted by Turkish PM 
Erdoan. Erdoan claimed that, in the aftermath of 17 December, Chirac had assured 
him in terms of Turkey signing the Additional Protocol would not mean recognition of 
the ‘Republic of Cyprus’, agreeing with (former) German Chancellor Schroeder, and 
Commission President Jose-Manuel Barosso.131 Hence, as opposed to the European 
Commission’s firm and clear statements, which is there is no obligation for Turkey to 
recognize the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ to begin the negotiations, President Chirac and other 
leaders treat the Cyprus dispute as a conditional requirement for opening accession 
negotiations. Therefore, it would not be wrong to suggest that the change in the 
discourse Chirac uses coincides with the post-referendum crises in France, which 
pushed him into domestic political struggle. 
 
Lastly, Chirac’s last move after the 3 October decisions asserts the fact that he 
starts to cover a more identity based rhetoric – that is rejecting Turkey’s European 
identity. On 4 October at press conference in Paris, he said Turkey has to undergo a 
“major cultural revolution” before she becomes a member to the EU, which is neither an 
accession criterion, nor a conditional requirement by the EU.   With reference to Turkey 
with a very pessimistic tone, Chirac said “Will it succeed? I cannot say. I hope so. But I 
am not at all sure”.132 He further states that the French public will have a referendum on 
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Turkish membership to the EU as a matter of democratic principles. In this regard, it 
reminds the previous enlargement, for which no referendum took place and leads one to 
ask if there were no democratic principles in May 2004. Thus, the linkage between 
domestic politics and international relations becomes apparent; the high level of 
opposition among French public forces the French leadership to change its position on 
an international issue. In addition, because the French President has no more credibility 
in domestic politics, his bargaining power in French domestic political environment is 
very low, which consequently leads him to relieve the tensions among French public 
through statements as such.  
 
It is also worth to notice the position of the former French President Valerie 
Giscard D’Estaing, who chaired the EU Constitutional Convention, and who is known 
with his extra-anti-Turkey sentiments. His arguments revolve around the culture-
identity sphere of argument, according to which Turkey has no place in the EU due to 
its massive Muslim population, its geographical location and to its non-European and 
Asian identity. On the eve of the 17 December Brussels Summit, Giscard defined the 
EU with Turkey as “the end of Europe” because of Turkey’s Muslim and Asian 
identity.133 In other words, “Turkey has no place in an alliance of Christian nations” for 
Giscard because 97% of Turkey’s land is in Asia and more than 99% of the nation is 
Muslim.134 Before the referendum on EU Constitution, he said, although Turkey is an 
important member, “Turkey cannot be a member of the European political system. 
Why? It will be the most numerous... and poorest, so all the funds will go to Turkey”.135 
Therefore, hesitation towards Turkey’s prospective membership among opinion and 
political leaders can be divided into two different perspectives of analyses: Turkey is 
culturally different from Europe; and Turkey will be the second biggest member state in 
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the decision making mechanism which will both lead to the end of the European 
integration project. 
 
Last of all, it is crucially important to note down the statements and declarations 
of Nicolas Sarkozy, who is one of the would-be presidents after the 2007 Presidential 
elections. His position is also important due to a possible coalition between the French 
Right and German Right; between him and Chancellor Angela Merkel. Sarkozy’s 
position on Turkey is clear; he does not want to see Turkey in the EU and is very much 
in favour of ‘privileged partnership’ for Turkey. In an interview on 18 December 2004, 
he states that he agrees with Chirac on opening accession negotiations with Turkey and 
on having a referendum at the end of the process. However, for him, Turkey’s 
prospective membership should be discussed and privileged partnership is the best 
choice for Turkey. He further lists the reasons why he does not want Turkey to become 
a member; for Sarkozy, firstly, the EU already has 25 members and with the accession 
of Bulgaria and Romania, and of course of Croatia, it will become a Union of 28. 
Secondly, he defines Turkey as a Mediterranean Country and rejects Turkey’s European 
identity as he asks what the EU would say to Algeria, Morocco or Tunisia if they 
applied for membership if Turkey becomes a member.136 For Sarkozy, Turkey is an 
excellent partner of European common market, however, giving Turkey the biggest say 
in the decision making mechanism would make the EU fragile. Therefore, ‘privileged 
partnership’, which is “pure and simple”, would not only facilitate Turkish democracy, 
but also it will preserve the functioning of Europe, which needs reform.137 
 
The major reason why Sarkozy opposes Turkish membership in the EU is 
because Turkey has a huge population that the EU is unable to digest in the near future. 
On top of everything, the biggest of Sarkozy’s reservations is Turkey’s population; 
Turkey will have a population of 100 million which will give her the biggest voting 
rights within the Union as she will have the largest population.138 He is a strong ally of 
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Merkel on this particular subject matter and very much in favour of the idea of 
‘privileged membership’. In September 2004, when he was the Finance Minister, 
Sarkozy has stated the decision of Turkish membership “could only be taken after there 
had been a referendum in France, to know what the opinion of the French people is”.139 
Thus, it would not be wrong to suggest that Sarkozy bases his arguments over public 
opinion. Moreover, as has been stated above, the possible coalition between the French 
and German Rights will affect Turkey’s EU bid and the bargaining balance during the 
negotiations. Previously, when Schroeder was the Chancellor and Chirac was politically 
stronger, the two leaders were firm enough to support Turkey’s EU bid. The leaders 
officially declared that “in order to maintain democracy and peace in Europe, Turkey’s 
membership is necessary”.140 However, the centre of gravity of the pendulum has 
shifted. Sarkozy and Merkel have met in July 2005 and both leaders gave the signals of 
closer cooperation between Paris and Berlin on the issues with respect to the EU, one of 
which is their preferences on Turkey’s EU bid.141 Both leaders declared that a stronger 
Franco-German axis is essential. As a matter of fact, one of the issues they bluntly agree 
is ‘privileged partnership’ instead of full membership for Turkey. In response to 
Sarkozy’s statement that “the Franco-German axis is indispensable”, “Merkel gave the 
signals of how the future European politics will evolve by stating that ‘the axis is an 
essential element in the EU, but it goes without saying that it should not be directed 
against the other members. We need to open the Franco-German partnership to the rest 
of Europe’”.142 
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Above all, France’s position on Turkey is much more public opinion dependent. 
In other words, as France has a referendum tradition on critical policy matters; French 
politicians take public opinion into consideration more seriously than Germany. 
Therefore, it can be claimed that, as both Sarkozy and Chirac has officially declared, 
because France will have a referendum on Turkish accession when the time comes, the 
EU will still have the opportunity not to take Turkey in. Nevertheless, the position of 
the French public cannot be foreseen by today since neither Turkey nor the EU will be 
the same as today. In other words, although the French public opinion is very much 
against Turkish full-membership in the EU, Frenchmen and women might also have 
different perspectives in the future. Thus, French leaders’ insistence and emphasis on 
the future referendum on Turkish membership is more of domestic political game in 
using the French public opinion in other domestic concerns and reflecting the hesitancy 
of the French government rather than ensuring the future right of the French public. 
 
 
Great Britain 
   
 The United Kingdom is the biggest champion of Turkey in her EU bid. Unlike 
the previous member states that have been discussed above, the UK has continuously 
supported the prospective membership of Turkey. The reasons why the UK is more 
supportive for Turkey than the other two countries among the big three can be 
summarized as follows. First of all, Britain’s position and preferences within the EU is 
the biggest determinant in her position towards Turkey. Unlike France and Germany, 
the UK is a strong defender of an intergovernmental Europe rather than a much more 
federal Europe. Secondly, because the UK has joined the EU almost 20 years after the 
core member states, she does not cover a Euro-centric rhetoric, which provides France 
and Germany to claim that they are the ‘core Europe’. Thirdly, the Great Britain’s 
imperial past pushes her to act independently in terms of international relations. Above 
all, it can also be claimed that the very long-standing relations between the Britons and 
the Turks enables the two countries to have a special relationship. Thus, the discourse 
that Prime Minister Tony Blair and the Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs Jack Straw adopt will be analysed below, with respect to the 
points that are listed above.  
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 The UK’s tremendous support for Turkey’s accession bid during the bargaining 
among member states on 2-3 October cannot be undervalued. Before getting into that, 
previous statements of political leaders in the UK should be discussed. First of all, the 
UK has no ‘culture’ argument against Turkey; the only requirement of the UK 
government has been the fulfilment of the Copenhagen Criteria. In other words, the 
Blair government’s objective has been providing sticks to the already reforming Turkey. 
“Turkey, which is a bridge between east and west, will have to continue with 
democratic and human rights reforms” he said in a meeting with the Turkish Prime 
Minister before the 17 December Summit.143 It can further be claimed that the special 
relationship between the UK and the United States gives the UK the strong credentials 
to support the prospective membership of Turkey.  
 
In addition Turkey’s participation in European security organizations and its 
geographical proximity are the strongest motivations behind the supportive attitude of 
the UK. “Engaging with the Islamic world” is one of the goals of Great Britain.144 The 
discourse that the US covers is that Turkey constitutes a bridge between the Muslims 
and the Christians and she proves the world that democracy and Islam can coexist. In 
other words, Turkey provides a great example of America’s causes in the Middle East. 
In his visit for NATO’s Istanbul Summit, Bush said, he appreciates the Turkish 
example, as it “has set on how to be a Muslim country and at the same time a country 
which embraces democracy and the rule of law and freedom.”145 Blair echoes President 
Bush’s statement by saying “if it (Turkey) fulfils the same principles of human rights, 
then Muslim and Christian can work together”.146 Therefore, as a strong ally of the US, 
the UK is very much in favour of a Turkey, which is dedicated to the Western ideals.  
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 Moreover, as has been stated above, the UK is the champion of a less integrated 
Europe. In addition to this, the definition of the concept of ‘power’ for the UK differs 
from the Continental conception to a great extent. Although the UK is strongly 
dedicated to multilateralism in theory, she is very much for the old conception of ‘hard 
power’ rather than the European conception of ‘normative/civilian power’. The position 
and preferences of her with respect to the 2003 Iraq War demonstrates the best example 
for this assumption. With regard to the UK’s conception of power and her positions 
over Turkey’s accession bid, it could be asserted that Great Britain wants Turkey 
integrated to Europe as much as possible not only because of her ambitions concerning 
a less politically integrated Europe but also because she wants Turkey integrated to 
European security structures, which would facilitate to further strengthen these 
structures through the inclusion of the huge Turkish Armed Forces into the club. In 
addition, the blasts under a terrorist attack at the British Consulate – the Pera House – in 
Istanbul and in front of the HSBC building also strengthened the already close relations 
between Turkey and the UK.  For Blair, Turkish accession ‘may boost’ European 
security as he stated in July 2005 that “the prospect of Turkish membership, though 
obviously some time in the future, I think will be important for Europe and for its 
security”.147 Hence, Turkish membership would perfectly suit the British interests in the 
EU that is to have less political integration and more international role in the globalizing 
world.  
           
 The position of the UK is very clear with respect to Cyprus as opposed to other 
member states such as France and Germany. In a meeting with the Turkish Prime 
Minister, Tony Blair clearly asserted that “it is simply important for us to re-state the 
legal fact, which is the signing of the protocol does not involve the recognition of 
Cyprus”.148 It is also worth to state that the UK has particular interests in Cyprus as the 
island was a part of the Imperial Great Britain and as she still has a proportion of 
territory used as a military base in the Mediterranean. Therefore, her position on the 
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Cyprus dispute is the same with the Commission’s. On top of everything, the dispute is 
not treated as a political element within domestic politics in the UK. 
 
As has been stated above, the Prime Minister has no other arguments against 
Turkey’s accession bid such as Turkey’s non-European identity or her huge population 
which would ‘mean the end of Europe, but the fulfilment of the accession criteria. On 2 
November 2005 in the Prime Minister’s questions session in the House of Commons, 
Blair stated that he was “proud of opening accession negotiations with Turkey and 
Croatia”149 but with respect to a question on Orhan Pamuk’s trial on 23 November in a 
similar session, he said Turkey has to comply with the EU rules on freedom of speech if 
it wanted to join the EU”.150 Thus it would not be wrong to claim he has an objective 
position on Turkey. Nevertheless, for both Blair and Straw, 3 October is a historic day 
as Turkey’s accession has officially started.  
 
Nevertheless, for Straw, “Turkey has been a pert of European history for 
centuries”, as Turkey still “bears the marks of the Greek, Roman and Byzantine 
civilizations, which have done so much to shape modern Europe”.151 This statement is 
crucially important due to the fact that according to the anti-Turkish membership 
rhetoric, one of the reasons why Turkey lacks Europeanness is because she has no 
Roman heritage, which is essential in the formation of the European identity. Straw 
further addresses the fact that Turkey is one of the founding members of the Council of 
Europe and a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization since 1952. Thus, it 
can be stated that the UK still accommodates herself into the old – Cold-War – 
definition of Europe, in which Turkey has a long-standing and firm position. Moreover, 
Turkey’s accession is “Europe’s future too” for Straw, and “by welcoming Turkey we 
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will demonstrate that Western and Islamic cultures can thrive together as partners in the 
modern world”.152 Furthermore, due to her geographical proximity, Turkey’s EU 
membership will enable the EU have a more international role in terms of for example, 
fight against drug trafficking, cross-border crime, international terrorism, energy and of 
coarse economics.               
 
 Lastly, Blair’s and Straw’s support for prospective Turkish accession during 2-3 
October should be underlined. 3 October has been a “truly historic day for Europe and 
the whole of the international community”.153 The UK’s position on Turkey’s accession 
bid can be summarized as follows in Straw’s words: “the European Union faces a 
moment, the importance of which we must not underestimate. It will shape the future of 
the world in which we live. It is one upon which stands the security and prosperity of 
Europe itself. We cannot afford to get this wrong”.154 
 
 
 
 
Austria 
 
 The highest resistance against the prospective Turkish membership to the EU is 
among the Austrians. Austria has a longstanding anti-Turkish accession position in the 
EU not only because public opinion demands so but also because the Right is leading 
the country for many years. The Austrian contention towards Turkey’s accession bid 
became apparent when the Austrian Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik showed a high 
amount of political will in order not to grant Turkey accession. The preference of 
Austria is clear; Turkey’s privileged partnership with the EU rather than full-
membership to the EU serves her best interests. In fact, Austria’s position is no different 
than the French and German right, the only reason why Austria is observed as a case in 
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this chapter is because, firstly, hesitation towards Turkey’s EU bid is at its highest 
levels because the it is demonstrated legitimately as it is right at the core of Austria’s 
governance – at the government – and secondly because Austria is not among the big 
three with respect to the decision making mechanism in the EU. In other words, her 
relatively restricted power in the EU enables Austria to have a much freer space in the 
field of criticism. Nevertheless, Austria’s resistance is important due to the fact that she 
is one of the contributors to the EU budget and on top of everything she is used as a 
reference point among the anti-Turkey accession opinion and political leaders. Austria 
also accommodated herself into this role as the Austrian Head of Parliament Andreas 
Khol asserted that they have been “the voice of the EU’s silent public”.155  
 
 As has been previously stated, during the bargains in the General Affairs and 
External Relations Council on 3 October, Austria had a very firm position in terms of 
not granting Turkey acceding country status. The bargains took almost two days and the 
only reason was Austria’s resistance on certain aspects. The main reason, however, why 
Austria insisted so much on privileged partnership status for Turkey, which out of 
Turkey’s win-set, is because she wanted to reach a compromise on another issue that is 
opening accession negotiations with Croatia. In other words, Plassnik’s insistence on 
privileged partnership, for which Austria’s win-set enabled her to do so, gave her the 
necessary incentives to have a deal on Croatia, which is a neighbour of Austria. Thus, in 
this thesis, it is argued that the game that Austria played is again a matter of Putnam’s 
win-set analysis. 
 
 Chancellor Wolfgang Schuessel said he was ‘proud’ of what had happened 
during 2-3 October 2005.156  As has also been given before, he also said that Austria 
had reached her goal. Thus, although Austria could not achieve her goal of privileged 
partnership for Turkey, the Austrian government actually got what it wanted. Further, 
the Chancellor said that the EU has to take “popular concerns” into consideration, 
which is a point of view that might lead to “theological-political divide” in Straw’s 
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words.157 Above all, for the Austrian leadership, Turkey lacks European identity, which 
will constitute a huge obstacle for Turkey in the accession negotiations. In an interview 
with Chancellor Schuessel, he stated that Europe’s borders are vague towards the East; 
Turkey has to practically and culturally admit European values in order to overcome the 
difficulties of the open-ended process of negotiations. He further adds that if the Eastern 
and all the Mediterranean countries in addition to Russia are considered as Europe, then 
the EU will resemble an organization like the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe.158 The words of Schuessel can be claimed to be denying 
Turkey’s European identity and defining Turkey in European neighbourhood rather than 
inside Europe. Therefore it is not very surprising that Austria is very much pro 
‘privileged partnership’ and against Turkish prospective EU membership. In addition, 
he prefers Turkey staying within the limits of European security organizations. 
 
 Above all, Austria’s preferences and positions on Turkey’s accession bid are 
clear. The Austrian government is very much against Turkey’s prospective membership 
due to cultural reasons on top of Turkey’s massive population. The limited win-set of 
the Austrian government enables it to impose its preferences on other member states, 
which is demonstrated in 3 October decisions.  Hence, Putnam’s two-level game 
analysis perfectly fits to the analysis of the Austrian position on Turkey’s EU bid. 
Lastly, it should also be noted that Austria’s relative power limited the Austrian 
government only to achieve certain desired outcomes in the 3 October IGC, which also 
gives Moravcsik’s theory.  
 
 In sum, member state preferences and specifically government leaders play a 
very important role with respect to Turkey’s EU bid. The other aspect of relations that is 
public opinion on Turkey and her membership to the EU will be elaborated in Chapter 
IV. What has so far been asserted is that the relative power of member states and 
government leaders’ preferences have huge impacts on Turkish membership. In addition 
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to this, because leaders seek to remain in or gain power, they ultimately pursue certain 
rhetoric that would be favoured by their constituents. In other words, leaders prefer to 
use certain types of language in order to secure their position at the office. Therefore, 
the mutually interactive relationship between the government leaders and the European 
citizens influence the positioning of the EU as a whole at the final stage at both levels.     
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
 
Public opinion in the EU towards Turkey’s accession bid 
 
 
 Member State preferences and positions on Turkey’s accession bid through a 
discourse analysis have so far been discussed in the previous chapters. Following the 
analyses of Robert Putnam and Andrew Moravcsik on public determinants of 
government preferences as the theoretical framework, analysing public attitudes is a 
must in this final chapter. In other words, government preferences do not take shape in a 
vacuum but public opinion sets the borders of how far the governments can go. The 
conclusion that has been reached in the previous chapter is, briefly, government leaders’ 
preferences in certain member states – for our purposes, Germany, France, Great Britain 
and Austria – are determined by their positions in domestic politics. In other words, 
leaders adopt certain rhetoric that is to a great extent determined and shaped by their 
own publics’ positions on the prospective Turkish membership to the EU due to the fact 
that leaders’ are under pressure specifically by their constituents and by the public in 
general on certain policy matters. Therefore, public opinion has a very important role in 
the policy making process as most of the international bargaining processes are done 
within the boundaries of what is acceptable to the public.  
 
 Public support to the EU governments’ policies choices have become important 
for the last two decades in an increasing fashion since the democratic accountability of 
the EU is one of the major questions posed to the legitimacy of the Union. In other 
words, increasing the democratic accountability of the EU is one of the major priorities 
among the policy makers in the EU to provide a source of legitimacy for such an 
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ambitious project. Thus, the publics’ approval has become more important as the 
legitimacy crisis deepened in the EU. Although it might be claimed that the EU is 
significantly more democratic in its own structures, i.e. through granting increasing 
powers to the European Parliament, than it was a decade ago, one can hardly assert that 
the EU is fully legitimate in the eyes of the European publics.  
 
As the Turkish accession to the EU is one of the most controversial issues in the 
agenda of the EU, the position of the European public opinion on the issue will be 
analysed in this chapter. In other words, not only because there is tremendous level of 
interaction between public opinion and decision makers’ preferences, but also because 
of the high tensions that the prospective Turkish membership to the EU creates within 
the EU both in terms of governmental relations and of governments and masses 
interactions, it is crucially important to analyse Turkey-EU relations in this respect. 
There are two main aspects of the public’s views on Turkey: one is centred on the costs 
of Turkey’s membership to the EU, which revolves around the utilitarian perspective, 
and the other is on the questions of identity. Hence, in this chapter, a quantitative 
analysis will be done through exploring Eurobarometer surveys. The focus of the 
analyses will be the prospective Turkish membership. The previous chapter will be the 
reference point; a correlation between the European identity and support/opposition for 
Turkish membership will be endeavoured to be established. In addition to this, the 
socio-economic situations in member states vis-à-vis the priorities of the public will be 
examined. Therefore, the Eurobarometer 63 survey will be the main data to be analysed.  
 
Even though the public opposition to Turkey’s membership revolves around 
questions of Europeanness and identity, it is still a matter of uncertainty whether EU 
member state citizens identify themselves Europe-wide or nationwide. In other words, 
although the EU is far beyond the level of integration of the 1970s and 1980s, it could 
be stated that Europeanness does not yet supersede national identities; Europeanness has 
not yet fully established. In contrast, a Europe-wide extreme nationalism is spreading 
due to a variety of reasons that are beyond the scope of this dissertation. In order to 
measure EU member state citizens’ identification as European, the Eurobarometer 63 
survey will be used below. The two propositions that will be elaborated are if the level 
of Europeanness and European identity constitute a reason for opposition on Turkey’s 
membership to the EU, and whether or not the materialist and utilitarian explanations on 
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the issue are the main determinants; which is to say whether the foreseen costs of the 
prospective Turkish membership are the causes of the high level of public opposition on 
Turkey’s accession bid.     
 
 The survey questions of the Eurobarometer 63, which constitute the basis for our 
identity argument, are as follows: “the climate of opinion” that is basically the 
satisfaction of and the expectations from the EU among the European citizens, the 
European citizen’s view of the EU membership, the image of the EU and “confidence 
expressed in the Commission and the EP”. As has been stated above, these questions 
lead one to assume whether, or not, the European citizens, or namely the public opinion 
in the EU, are for or against the EU and its policies. Although these questions do not 
directly illustrate conclusions over European identity, it can further be asserted that the 
sum of all somewhat derives one to assume there is a certain level of identity formation 
or vice versa. Hence, the expectations and satisfaction of the European publics are the 
assets of the materialist and the utilitarian perspectives on Turkish membership to the 
EU; the second part, which is the publics’ confidence in EU institutions is the source of 
data whether Europeans identify themselves with the EU or not and if the proposed 
level of Europeanness interacts with the support for and opposition to Turkey’s 
membership.   
 
 
I. Literature review on support for European Integration 
 
To begin with, public opinion and/or European citizens’ attitudes toward 
European integration have been widely discussed and analysed by many scholars 
previously. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to give what has previously been 
asserted on this linkage; how one interprets public opinion depends on where he/she 
stands conceptually, ideologically and theoretically. In other words, one’s interpretation 
of mass and elite attitudes on European integration depends on the concepts and the 
theory he/she adopts as the author. The literature on European integration is important 
in order to reveal and/or analyse publics’ perceptions on Turkish membership. 
Nevertheless, it would be fair to suggest that, for the purposes of the thesis dissertation, 
there is an enormous and increasing amount of interaction between the public and elite 
attitudes with respect to the European integration project due to the fact that the EU is 
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no longer an elite project and citizens’ lives are under direct influence of the EU 
decisions rather than national laws and practices. In addition, the publics’ involvement 
in the EU policy making is endeavoured to be increased through referenda and 
representative channels and through the institution of the European Parliament in order 
to provide a considerable level of legitimacy to the EU.  
 
No particular theory of mass-elite attitudes is adopted in this last chapter. The 
previous chapter, in which government leaders’ preferences and positions are analysed, 
will be endeavoured to be connected to this chapter through a quantitative analysis with 
the help of Eurobarometer surveys. The focus will be the April 2005 Eurobarometer and 
there will be no comparison between consecutive years. Hence, the purpose of this 
chapter is to explain governments’ preferences through quantitative data on public 
opinion. Nevertheless, it would be enlightening to provide a certain amount of 
background on the previous studies that has been conducted in the field. The major 
reference points in this chapter are Matthew Gabel, who correlates economic conditions 
and support for membership, Lauren McLaren, who has endeavoured to explain 
preferences of mass public beyond economic determinism, and Gary Marks and Liesbet 
Hooghe, who previously explored the reasons for support for EU membership through 
the light of multi-level governance theory. 
 
 
Material interests and support for European integration: The case of Turkish accession 
  
Public opinion is one of the major foci of political scientific research, especially 
for the last few decades. American public opinion has been the focus of the early 
researchers; the developments in the EU especially after the 1970s attracted more 
scholars over time to conduct research on the public opinion in the EU. Although it 
could be claimed that the public does not have consistent and coherent attitudes and 
polities on varying policies and with respect to different leaderships, public opinion 
matters a lot for the decision makers’ own sake as government and political leaders, as 
those who consistently seek to remain in power, or gain power for those who do not 
participate in the decision making process. In other words, there are numerous 
determinants of public opinion and it is very difficult and inappropriate to identify a 
single or a few causes for publics’ attitudes. Nevertheless, the explanation for mass 
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attitudes will revolve around two theoretical assumptions that are the economic/material 
interests assumption and the identity question.  
 
 The economic explanations, nevertheless, deserve to be considered as a plausible 
source of reference. Gabel examines the impact of the economic preferences of the 
public on their international preferences. In other words, he explores in his study, 
“whether citizens’ attitudes toward international economic policy (i.e., EU membership) 
reflect their differential economic interests related to that policy”.159 Macro and micro 
economic conditions in member states affect the level of support for EU membership 
among the public to a great extent. For instance, previous research has found that the 
level of inflation (macro-economic) and market liberalization (micro-economic) such as 
transformation of the national market, i.e. the four freedoms of movement, have a 
considerable amount of impact in the formation of public opinion in the EU.  
 
In addition, the ability to exploit economic opportunities with respect to 
liberalization affects support.160 Hence, so far in previous studies, it has been claimed 
that skilled workers benefit more than unskilled workers in the labour market in the EU 
as a result of European economic integration. The international economic theory 
suggests that  “the economic benefits of an internal market for an unskilled or a skilled 
worker depends on how well he/she can compete with workers in his/her occupation 
throughout the market, not with other factors of production in his/her nation.”.161 
However, the European economic integration does not benefit high-wage unskilled 
workers since firms, in an integrated market with free mobility, would prefer low-wage 
unskilled workers. Therefore, two conclusions could be driven from the aforementioned 
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hypothesis. Firstly, the reason why support in wealthier member states, where wages are 
higher, would be expected to be lower due to the fact that low-skilled cheap labour 
attracts firms to employ. In other words, firms tend to employ cheaper labour in low-
wage jobs. Therefore, it leads one to automatically assume that the public in the existing 
member states should not be expected to support enlargement, as it is a policy that is 
directed towards poorer countries especially in the last decade and in the case of 
Turkey. Secondly, in an environment where unemployment is already very high, such as 
Germany and France, people would not welcome new comers due to the fact that 
enlargement would not constitute a priority and that people are already discontented 
because of economic dissatisfaction.162 Hence, “citizens’ support for membership in the 
EU is consistent with their occupation-based economic interests”.163 It is also worth 
noting that a similar logic could be applied to the capital market, which is to say, the net 
receivers of “financial pay-offs” would benefit and consequently support more than the 
net contributors of the EU budget.164 
 
 It would also be wrong to assume that the only reason for support is economics 
and/or material interests since member states’ preferences vary in accordance with their 
publics’. In other words, public in different member states have different positions on 
certain policies or different causes for support for certain policies as such. The non-
economic approaches on support for membership could be enlightening in this case. As 
has been stated before, information about the EU could be claimed to be one of 
determinants of support. The more politically affiliated people are, the more they are 
supportive of European integration due to the level of information they receive. In other 
words, in McLaren’s words, “the more information one receives about the EU, the less 
threatening the organization becomes”.165 People’s value system can also be assumed to 
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be another non-economic factor in the level of public support. The materialist – post-
materialist distinction is worth to note; people, who adopt post-materialist values, which 
are more abstract in nature, such as democracy or protection of environment, tend to 
support enlargement more than those, who are materialist since the EU is an abstract 
concept itself. Finally, the performance of the national governments as another 
determinant should also be mentioned. Usually, on certain – unsuccessful – policies, the 
remedies are attributed to the EU and the Union is used as a scapegoat. Thus, going 
back to the information assumption, it can be stated that support for the EU is also 
determined by the circumstances at the national level since the information people 
receive depends on how the information is syndicated.    
  
The question of European identity and Enlargement toward Turkey 
  
 The costs of enlargement are taken more readily if the EU public perceives the 
candidate as a part of the European identity. It is not a matter of question whether 
candidate countries to the EU are evaluated on the basis of Copenhagen political and 
economic criteria; it is taken for granted. In other words, in 1993, the EU has made clear 
that candidate countries have to sufficiently fulfil certain criteria in order to start 
accession negotiations. However, the EU member states have been more favourable to 
the CEECs and Mediterranean countries than they have been on Turkey’s accession bid. 
For instance, although Bulgaria and Romania were economically and politically less 
qualified candidates, they have started accession negotiations years, while Turkey 
remained as the only candidate country that had not started negotiations.166 For a more 
recent example, Poland will receive a total of 59.7 billion Euros from the EU budget in 
the next six years while Turkey will receive 40 million Euros for initiating the civil-
society dialogue.167 Thus, as Sjursen asserts, “in the process of supporting applicant 
states in their efforts to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria, the EU has given priority to some 
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states over others”.168 In other words, domestic politics in member states has not forced 
the leaderships to hesitate on enlarging regarding the May 2004 enlargement due to the 
fact that enlargement was taken for granted by the European publics as culturally the 
central and eastern Europeans belonged to naturally Europe. 
 
The underlying cause of the difference in the rhetoric, which has been explored 
in the previous chapter, and in treatment with respect to enlargement can be claimed to 
be Turkey’s non-European identity. Although Turkey was one of the biggest allies of 
the Western camp during the Cold-War, the Europeanness that had been attached to 
Turkey in terms of Western ideals has been replaced by a non-European identity. In 
other words, the definition of Europe and Europeanness has been changed in the 
aftermath of the Cold-War since the ideological counterpart of Western ideals – 
communism – that ‘kidnapped’ eastern Europe and threatened Western Europe expired. 
Thus, the definition of Europe, which was previously based on democracy and human 
rights, has been partly replaced by a cultural definition, according to which 
Europeanness means common cultural heritage.  
 
The European identity, therefore, “has been reconstructed with ethno-cultural 
dimensions clarifying who is European and who is not”, which lead to the formation of 
“Turkey’s perpetual outsider status”.169 Hence, the democratic ideals, to which Turkey 
has had strong commitment, were no more at the core of the Europeanness; “a common 
cultural heritage, with foundations in ancient Greece, Christianity, and Europe of the 
Enlightenment” are the new elements that define European identity.170 Hence, “it is the 
cultural logic of ‘us and them’, of collective identity”, in which Turkey has a fairly less 
place in ‘us’ then eastern European countries according to the Western Europeans.  
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 The above proposition strengthens the presupposition of the “kinship based 
duty” that the Western Europeans felt towards the Eastern European regarding the 
policy of enlargement. Justifications for enlargement with respect to the ten new 
member states revolved around the identity argument. Not only the discourse that is 
used by the opinion leaders and decision makers but also the publics’ support for the 
previous enlargement demonstrates the established place of identity in the justification 
process. However, with respect to Turkey, neither the rhetorical actions of the leaders, 
nor the public illustrates a support as such, which consequently leads one to question 
Turkey’s European identity and its place in Europe. Thus, while the eastern Europeans 
“rejoined” the EU as they were the abandoned part of Europe as a whole, “Turkey is 
described as an important partner of Europe”.171        
  
 Above all, the question of identity should be helpful to explain the parts where 
material interests argument is insufficient in analysing member states’ and publics’ 
attitudes on Turkey. In addition to this, the “perceived cultural threat” that Turkey poses 
to the Europeans also feeds the argument not only because Turkey is much more 
populated and much poorer than the CEECs but also because the perception of Turkey’s 
cultural European identity lacks.   
 
II. Analysis of Attitudes and Support for Turkey’s membership 
 
This thesis argues that there is a correlation between levels of satisfaction, i.e. 
material interests, and Turkish accession. For this purpose, the Eurobarometer 63 data is 
to be analysed. One would expect that as the level of satisfaction with the EU increases, 
so would support to enlargement and to Turkish accession. First of all, the level of 
satisfaction with EU policies and procedures in the EU 25 is fairly high with 80 percent. 
The Eurobarometer question for this analysis is as follows:  
• On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or 
not at all satisfied with the life you lead?172 
 Here, the phrase “the life you lead” is interpreted as satisfaction with the EU laws and 
practices and the policies and procedures, which constitute more than 80% of member 
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states’ laws. In other words, the level of satisfaction with the EU refers to the material 
interests of the European peoples. The EU average this is 81%; 60% of which is for 
“fairly satisfied”. The percentage of satisfaction in Germany and France is slightly over 
the EU average by 83% for each, and 86% for Austria. Interestingly, the level of 
satisfaction in the UK is even more than that of the German and the French public with 
88%. However, it might also be stated that the UK adopts a more independent economic 
policy as she opts out from certain economic and social policies; i.e., she neither is in 
the euro zone, nor belongs to the Schengen countries.  Thus, the question is whether the 
European public want to spread this material interest to Turkey.  
 
 
 
MS 
very satisfied with 
the life they lead 
fairly satisfied with 
the life they lead 
Total 
satisfaction 
Germany 21 62 83 
France 19 64 83 
The UK 32 56 88 
Austria 19 67 86 
EU Average 21 60 81 
 
In addition, the expectations with respect to the European life style are optimistic 
with 34% for better expectations and 51% for same expectations. The survey question 
is: 
• What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next 
twelve months be better, worse or the same, when it comes to…? (Your 
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life in general) / (The economic situation in our country) / (The financial 
situation of your household) / (The employment situation in our country) 
/ (Your personal job situation)173  
The public in the UK has the highest rate regarding “better expectations” with 42%, 
same as French expectations, as opposed to 20 and 24 percent rates for Germany and 
Austria. Hence, it could be claimed that if the publics are satisfied materially at home, it 
could also be asserted that they would support its enlargement as well. This conclusion, 
however, is only true for the UK, since a clear hesitation of the French public is 
existent. For this reason, the question of identity should be included in the picture, 
according to which the level of attachment to European identity and the level of support 
to enlargement are positively correlated. In other words, the French opposition to 
Turkish accession is because of the fact that the French public has no feeling of “kinship 
based duty” towards Turkey as they had for the Central and Eastern Europeans. 
Therefore, the proposition of material interests is not applicable to the French case and 
consequently, support for Turkish accession in France is very low.  
   
Better expectations Germany  France The UK Austria EU Average 
Life in General 20 42 42 24 34 
The economic situation 17 17 15 15 19 
The financial situation 14 29 31 18 24 
The employment situation 15 19 16 13 18 
Personal job situation 14 26 25 18 22 
Worse expectations Germany  France The UK Austria EU Average 
Life in General 15 10 5 9 11 
The economic situation 48 42 27 32 37 
The financial situation 23 17 11 12 18 
The employment situation 54 50 28 42 42 
Personal job situation 12 6 5 6 9 
 
With respect to the economic situation, however, the optimistic picture changes. 
On top of the 19% average, the expectation for better economic situation in the future is 
even lower in all four member states. Nevertheless, expectation for the same economic 
situation in the UK and Austria is over 10 percent higher than in Germany and France. 
Furthermore, expectation for worse employment situation on the EU average is 42 
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percent. On top of this, the percentage is even higher in France, Germany and Austria as 
opposed to the 28 percent in the UK. Moreover, the better personal job situation 
expectation in the UK and in France is slightly over the 22 percent average of the EU as 
opposed to the lower expectations in Germany and Austria. Above all, it can be stated 
that the economic rationality theory can be adopted in explaining public support for 
Turkey. As has been stated previously, the more the public is satisfied with the 
economic conditions at home, the more people tend to support European integration and 
the Turkish enlargement. In the case of France, but especially of Germany, the macro 
and micro economic conditions are not very fair to people. In other words, more than 
five million Germans constitute the 11 percent unemployed in Germany, who are not 
expected to support EU policies. It is, therefore, plausible to assume that the low level 
of support to Turkish accession among Germans is to a certain extent due to the high 
level of macro and micro economic difficulties at home since the level of material 
satisfaction determines the level of support to Turkey’s membership. British position 
toward Turkish accession could be explained in a similar logic, which will be elaborated 
below. The UK follows more independent economic policies and has a completely 
different and established liberal economic structure when compared to France and 
Germany. Consequently, do the Britons identify less with the EU? 
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The answer to this question would be yes, as will also be seen below when the level of 
Europeanness in the UK is elaborated. Thus, the British support for Turkey’s EU bid at 
the public and elite level could be explained from two different perspectives: firstly the 
British are economically/materially are more satisfied at home then any other three 
member states, which makes them more comfortable with the EU, especially in 
expressing their expectations for the future and economic/material satisfaction with the 
EU as they have no fear of allocating their scarce resources. This is also the reason why 
French and German publics strongly oppose Turkish accession; both publics are neither 
satisfied with the life they lead nor they draw a positive economic and materially 
smooth picture for the future and nor do they support Turkey’s accession. Secondly, as 
has been presupposed above and as will be explained below, the level of feeling of 
Europeanness in the UK is relatively low in the UK when compared to the other three 
countries. Thus, European identity in the UK and support for Turkey’s membership is 
negatively correlated; the relatively low attachment to Europeanness can be claimed to 
be one of the reasons for support for Turkey’s EU bid. This also explains the Austrian 
public’s attitudes. The Austrians show similar attitudes with the UK economically and 
materially, which leads one to assume the material interests assumption fails to explain 
the extremely low support for Turkey’s membership in Austria. The second proposition, 
however, explains the Austrian behaviour adequately; the level of Europeanness is 
higher in Austria than it is in the UK, which will also be seen below. Thus, because the 
Austrians adopt a different definition of Europe and European identity, which has also 
been described above, their attitudes on Turkish accession differ, despite their similar 
economic/material expectations and satisfaction.             
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 The question of whether the EU membership is a good or a bad thing is as 
follows: 
• Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)’s membership 
of the European Union is (A good thing) / (A bad thing) / (Neither good 
nor bad) / (Don’t Know).174  
The question is responded as a good thing with 54 percent on the EU average. The 
percentages in Germany and France remain close to the average. However, the people 
of the UK and Austria evaluate EU membership in this regard as a good thing only with 
37 and 36 percents. Thus, despite the fact that the UK is satisfied with the economic 
policies of the EU, Euro-scepticism in the UK is significantly high. In other words, 
although the Britons are satisfied with the life they lead in general, this satisfaction is 
only relevant when one speaks economically as can be observed via their responses on 
their satisfaction level with, i.e. the economic and employment situation. A similar 
proposition can be made on the Austrian public’s position. Likewise, the EU average of 
the benefits of EU membership is 55 percent as opposed to the detriments of 
membership of 33 percent. The situation in France and Germany, which is very near the 
EU average, is again different than the positions of the Austrian public and the British 
public. Only 40% and 41% of the Britons and Austrians state that they have benefited 
from membership, whereas 42% and 46% of the people think they have not benefited. 
Thus, this result further supports the proposition above, which is to say the publics in 
Austria and Great Britain are less satisfied with EU membership than in Germany and 
France. In the Austrian case, however, the question of identity comes into the picture 
amongst the reasons why the Austrian public is against Turkish membership. Moreover, 
over the half of the Britons and Austrians feel less safe within the EU in addition to the 
French public’s position. With respect to economics, the situation is vice versa, as the 
Germans and the French feel around 10 percent less economically stable than the 
British. The highest feeling of political instability is in France and Austria with 66% and 
65% while the Germans and the Britons remain around 50 percent. Thus, stability at 
home affects the level of support to the EU and its enlargement towards Turkey since it 
might be presupposed by the public that material losses would increase with Turkish 
accession.  
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As the public feels more European, support to Turkey’s membership would 
increase. How the EU is perceived amongst the publics is questioned in the 
Eurobarometer, which could be interpreted as a measure to understand the level of 
Euro-skepticism. The question is: 
• In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, 
fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?175 
46 percent of the Europeans regard the EU to have a positive image as opposed to the 
18 percent of negative image. However, only 30 percent of the Austrians and 29 percent 
of the Britons conjure up for a positive image and 33% and 35% invoke a negative 
image respectively. This high level of negative image of the EU among the Austrians 
and the Britons further illustrates the level of Euro-scepticism. Lastly, the question of:  
• Are you, yourself, for or against the development towards a European 
political union?176 
can be claimed to be the final illustrator of the above proposition. Although the 
Germans with 64 percent and the French with 54 percent are in favour of a political 
union, the Austrians only with 40% and the British with 34% support the idea of it. 
Above all, the public in the UK and in Austria support their membership to the EU only 
to a limited extent as can be observed through the analyses. With respect to support for 
Turkey, it can be claimed that the level of identification as European is a determinant in 
the level of support. The Austrian case is unique in this sense since, the Austrians 
position and our proposition diverge. Nevertheless, the question is general in this sense; 
to the EU and its institutions illustrates that the sense of belonging to the EU is much 
higher in Austria than it is in UK, which highlights the correlation between 
opposition/support to Turkey.  
 
  The survey question that measures the legitimacy of the Union’s institutions is 
as follows: 
• For each of them, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust 
it? (The European Parliament) / (The European Commission)177 
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The trust in the EU institutions enables one to have claims on the legitimacy of the EU 
in the eyes of the public. The average trust in the European Parliament is 52 percent. 
This percentage is 46% in Germany, 50% in France, 48 percent in Austria and 35 
percent in the UK. The trust in the European Commission is even further lower; the EU 
average is 46 percent in addition to the 37 percent in Germany, 45 percent in France, 44 
percent in Austria and 31 percent in the UK.  
 
The European Commission 
MS Tend to trust Tend not to trust 
Germany 37 42 
France 45 35 
The UK 31 38 
Austria 44 39 
EU 
Average 46 31 
The European Parliament 
MS Tend to trust Tend not to trust 
Germany 46 40 
France 50 34 
The UK 35 38 
Austria 48 42 
EU 
Average 52 31 
 
Therefore, the EU has the least legitimacy in the eyes of the public in the UK. 
Interestingly, the Frenchmen and women have the highest trust in the Commission 
among the four countries that are analysed. It can be stated that trust in the EU and its 
institutions tells us that the level of trust is negatively correlated with support to Turkey. 
The more the people trust in the EU, the less they would support Turkey’s accession 
bid. Trust in the EU’s institutions means that publics in the four member states identify 
themselves as European citizens of the EU to a considerable extent. Thus, Austrians’ 
opposition to Turkey is not very surprising in this sense since almost half of the 
Austrians identify with the EU institutions, which is considerably high. This also 
explains the differences in the attitudes of the Austrians and the Britons on Turkey 
despite their similar attitudes on economic/material gains of the EU.  
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Above all, support for EU institutions can be claimed to be one of the signals for 
support for the EU. In other words, publics’ positive attitudes towards institutions grant 
a certain level of legitimacy to the EU and its decisions; trust is an important indicator 
of the legitimacy of the Union. Thus, this thesis argues that one would expect as the 
level of Europeanness gets stronger opposition to prospective Turkish membership 
would increase. This might also be partly why the UK is more favourable to Turkey 
than the other three member states. It can be observed in the above tables that the UK 
significantly supports the EU institutions less than the other member states. Hence, on 
top of economic explanations, identity argument shall also be considered as a term of 
reference in explaining opposition.       
 
Lastly, it is worth to note the conception of “perceived threat” in explaining 
mass attitudes on Turkish accession. “Fear of, or hostility toward, other cultures” 
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constitute an important reason for contention. In explaining Austrian publics attitudes, 
the best way to formulize the very low level of support for Turkey’s accession bid, is to 
assume that “people do not necessarily calculate the costs and benefits of the EU to their 
own lives when thinking about issues of European integration, but instead are ultimately 
concerned about problems related to the degradation of the nation-state.”178 Opposition 
to Turkey, which has constituted the “other” for the Europeans, has a certain amount of 
identity component. Thus, it can be claimed that Austrian mass attitudes are formed 
through economic satisfaction and expectations in certain areas in accordance with the 
British. However, the point where the Austrians and the Britons attitudes do not match 
is their support for the institutions,  
 
The most important issues facing the publics of the EU member states are 
mainly economic; unemployment is the highest among all with 50 percent in addition to 
economic situation (27%), rising prices/inflation (16%), and taxation (7%).179  
 
 
 
MS 
Economic 
Situation 
Rising 
prices/inflation Unemployment 
Germany 42 9 81 
France 25 24 67 
Austria 21 20 63 
The UK 8 3 11 
 
The values in Germany are striking, as the major problem is signified as unemployment 
with 81 percent and economic situation with 42 percent by the Germans. The position of 
the French public opinion is not very different from the German; the 67 percent of the 
French people say the most important problem is unemployment and 24 percent say the 
rising prices are the most important problems. The Austrians signify unemployment as 
the most important problem by 63 percent as well.  
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However, only 11 percent of the Britons signify unemployment as the major problem in 
addition to the 8 percent for the economic situation and 3 percent for the rising prices. 
The position of the British public further illustrates the economic satisfaction of the 
Britons. However, the Britons are less socially satisfied as crime and healthcare system 
are signified as the major problems with 31% and 30% as opposed to the 21% and 9% 
in France, 24% and 9% in Austria and 14% and 10% in Germany. Interestingly, 
immigration is amongst the most important problems with 31 percent. In contrast, 
immigration according to the French with 11 percent, the Austrians with 16 percent, and 
6 percent in Germany is the most important problem. Above all, firstly, it could be 
asserted that the more the Europeans are socially satisfied, the more they feel European. 
This proposition can also be supported with the European (continental) social model as 
opposed to the laissez-faire approach of the UK. Secondly, economically, public in the 
Continental European member states – Germany, France and Austria – is much less 
satisfied as opposed to the British, which further attaches them to their European 
identity. In other words, the economic hardships in the three member states have 
nothing to do with their attachment to the European identity. With respect to the Turkish 
prospective membership to the EU, at this point, it can be stated that the economic 
hardships push the Europeans to hesitate to welcome Turkey in the club because of 
Turkey’s massive and poor population, which would bring extra burdens on the 
shoulders of the Europeans. For the Britons, who are more satisfied economically and 
less attached to the EU; the Turkish integration would not constitute a major element of 
concern. Lastly, it can be observed that the Austrians are not materially and 
economically very comfortable at home in contradiction with what have been said 
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previously. This particular data, therefore, increases the credibility of the material 
interest argument since the Austrians are not at all economically/materially happy, 
which gives Austria another reason to find Turkish membership detrimental. 
The survey question on enlargement is as follows: 
• For each of the following countries, would you be in favour or against it 
becoming part of the European Union in the future? (Turkey)180 
MS 
In 
Favour Against 
Germany 21 74 
France 21 70 
The UK 45 37 
Austria 10 80 
EU Average 35 52 
 
Support for Turkey’s membership is 35 percent on the EU average and 21 percent in 
Germany and France, 10 percent in Austria and 45 percent in the UK. As has been 
endeavoured to be given before, this position of the German, French and Austrian 
publics is mainly due to the material costs of Turkey. In other words, because Turkey 
has a huge population, which is a mainly poor huge amount of money to be allocated to 
Turkish accession is expected. Above all, it could be asserted that, firstly, economic 
rationality and materialist arguments fits to this dissertation in explaining the contention 
of the European publics towards Turkish accession. Secondly, it could also be stated 
that the level of feeling of Europeanness is positively correlated with the level of 
opposition to Turkey’s membership to the EU. Hence, the best way to overcome this 
clash between EU decisions and mass attitudes is to increase the visibility of the 
economic benefits of the EU in member states, and to trigger a civil society dialogue 
within the EU and between Turkey and the EU to beat the mutual misunderstandings 
between cultures, namely the “perceived cultural threat”.   
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 In conclusion, Turkey’s membership would be most easily sold to European 
public if the EU governments could demonstrate its economic/material benefits of 
Turkey. Enlargement is not amongst the priorities of the European citizens. As opposed 
to the 4 percent support for enlargement, “fighting poverty and social exclusion” 
constitute 44 percent and “fighting unemployment” 47 percent among the priorities.181 
The percentages are 41% and 60% in Germany, 54% and 63% in France, 45% and 53% 
in Austria and 33% and 15% in the UK respectively. The support for enlargement is the 
same with the EU average; 4 percent both in Austria and the UK and 2 percent in 
Germany and France.  
The priorities of the EU should be… 
 
Welcoming new member 
countries Fighting poverty and social exclusion Fighting unemployment 
Germany 2 41 60 
France 2 54 63 
The UK 4 33 15 
Austria 4 45 53 
EU Average 4 44 47 
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Above all, as can clearly be observed, enlargement is not amongst the priorities of the 
EU according to the European citizens.  
 
In sum, back to the economic rationality argument, if the publics in member 
states were more materially satisfied at home, support for Turkey’s accession would be 
much higher as can be observed in the British case. In other words, although it is not 
very certain if enlargement would constitute a priority for the Europeans or not, Turkish 
accession would be more favourable if the member states’ governments were able to 
sell the economic benefits of Turkey to their publics in the aftermath of providing 
material satisfaction at home. Although the identity argument helps one to better 
analyse certain behaviour of member states and attitudes of masses where material 
interests explanation remains insufficient, it is much more relevant for explaining 
attitudes at the elite level. Nevertheless, it should also be stated that the identity 
argument should not be undervalued; it not only provides a better understanding of 
certain attitudes, especially in the Turkish case with respect to enlargement, but also 
widens the approach and leads one to question other propositions more extensively. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 The rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 in France and the Netherlands 
has pushed the European Union (EU) into a crisis, which has roots in elite and mass 
attitudes toward the Union. The crisis can be named a ‘legitimacy crisis’ and will 
remain until when the decision makers in the EU fix the gap between the European 
citizens and the decision making bodies. Although the democratically elected 
governments in member states have the final word on decisions, the supranational 
authorities and their decisions affect the lives of European citizens to a tremendous 
extent. Therefore, member states have to increase the democratic accountability of the 
EU in order to overcome the lack of legitimacy. 
 
 Turkey’s accession to the EU is in the agenda of the EU’s enlargement policy 
since 1999 Helsinki Summit. 3 October is a turning point in the relations as the 
accession negotiations have finally begun. It would be fair to suggest that Turkey has 
been treated differently than the previous applicant countries. However, what has been 
endeavoured to be asserted in this dissertation is not the EU’s unfairness towards 
Turkey but an understandable reluctance among member states due to the Union’s 
enlargement fatigue and Turkey’s uniqueness in terms of population and culture. In 
other words, the procedures of enlargement towards Turkey and accession negotiations 
are no different than the official procedure; new rules and conditions have not been 
brought for Turkey. The difference lies in the rhetoric, which is to say, government 
leaders and opinion makers stress and underline certain facts continuously, which is also 
reflected in the official documents.  
 
 In this dissertation, the impacts of the preferences and positions of member 
states in the EU decision making mechanism with respect to Turkey’s prospective 
membership to the EU has been discussed. The dissertation adopts a theory synthesis; as 
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is focused in Chapter I, liberal intergovernmentalism, double-edged diplomacy and 
multi-level governance theory are synthesized. The empirical and historical analysis of 
Turkey-EU relations is endeavoured to be covered in Chapter II by providing the 
analysis of official documents meanwhile. Chapter III consists of the analysis of 
leaders’ speeches and attitudes towards Turkey, with which decision and opinion 
makers’ influence on the formation of the public opinion in the EU is evaluated. Lastly, 
Chapter IV tries to understand the reasons for opposition to Turkey’s membership to the 
EU amongst the EU publics. 
 
 Although enlargement is one of the most successful policies of the EU, there is a 
significant amount of resistance for future enlargement among member states. The EU 
has gone through five enlargement processes, the fifth of which gave 10 relatively poor 
post-communist central and eastern countries the status of membership in May 2004. 
The main purpose of enlargement is to promote democracy in new member states 
through normative/civilian power, on top of mutual economic benefits. The success of 
enlargement can be observed in, for instance, Spain and Ireland, where GDP per capita 
has increased since accession to a significant extent and where democracy has been 
consolidated. Despite the fact that “asymmetric interdependence” theorem is valid in the 
enlargement policy, where stronger member states that favoured enlargement the most 
has had to concede more than the weaker, the policy gives the EU strong credentials to 
become an international actor. In addition, the mutual benefits of enlargement cannot be 
undervalued despite its economic burdens on bigger member states. Therefore, 
“consistent with its dynamic nature, an enlarged Europe can best maintain coherence by 
means of this variable geometry ..., which, in turn, would help to reconcile the legal 
definition of the Union with its de facto arrangement, and would allow the EU to 
proceed with the agreed program of enlargement that has been such an essential part of 
its success story”.182  
 
 
 The Turkish enlargement will for sure be much more different than the previous 
enlargements when one takes Turkey’s geographical proximity, economic situation and 
massive population into consideration. It will be impossible for the EU to function 
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efficiently when Turkey becomes a member with the existing legal order since the 
current legal agreement – namely the Treaty of Nice does not adequately serve the best 
interests of the member states in terms of efficiency. In other words, the EU has to go 
through an institutional reform in order to deal with the future social, economic and 
political problems. A future as such is blurry due to the fact that the Constitutional 
Treaty that was created for this cause is rejected. However, the EU has to overcome the 
current legitimacy crisis in time in order to survive as a Union. Thus, either way or 
another, an institutional and legal reform will emerge as a matter of nature, unless 
member states decide to kill the EU by their own wills, which is very unlikely. 
 
As has been stated previously, neither the Pamuk affair, nor the Cyprus dispute 
and the Armenian question are at the major problems that cannot be resolved. In other 
words, neither of these confrontations between Turkey and the EU will constitute 
obstacles for Turkey’s membership because of the fact that Turkey has to first be 
understood by the European publics. During the time this thesis has been written, for 
instance, it was claimed that Orhan Pamuk’s trial, which has begun in October 2005, 
was not a real problem in the relations since Turkey would take the necessary measures 
in time in order to consolidate full freedom of speech. On 22 January 2006, the case was 
dropped by the Turkish court. However, one must also not to deny the internal 
reformation dynamics of Turkey. Thus, although the aforementioned disputes are much 
more established and have roots in history, they will be resolved indispensably in time. 
Thus, this at least shows how Turkey is committed to democratic ideals and to the EU 
membership. 
   
 It is also worth to mention that the crisis could be overcome not only through 
political will but with strong civil society dialogue. Achieving solidarity in the EU 
should be one of the main priorities of the political elite, which can only be done 
through initiating and investing in a dialogue among member states and with Turkey. 
As Jones suggests, “what we need to understand is what that support really is: how 
people support integration and why their support matters in practical terms...the answer 
is solidarity”.183 The EU was able to demonstrate a significant level of solidarity in the 
aftermath of 11 March bombings in Madrid, which it failed to have during Istanbul 
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blasts.184 Thus, it would not be wrong to suggest that the EU has reached a certain level 
of solidarity since its foundation, which is not to claim of course European identity 
supersedes national identities. A further civil society involvement within the European 
integration project and a strong civil society dialogue between the Turks and the 
Europeans would thus help both sides to overcome mutual misunderstandings and to 
increase familiarity between cultures. This could only be done with the encouragement 
of the political elite and with a strong civil society. The civil society in Turkey is not 
premature anymore and evolves in a positive way to reach the European levels of civil 
society involvement. Thus, despite the existence of a negative picture in terms of the 
European’s willingness to see Turkey in the EU, both Turkey and the EU have very 
strong inputs and motivation to overcome the difficulties in relations in 10 years time.         
 
 It is still an open question whether public opinion is directly related with 
government leaders’ preferences. In other words, whether leaders shape their policies in 
accordance with public’s position or not remains as a question mark. Despite the fact 
that current German and French leaderships oppose Turkey’s prospective membership 
to the EU, the previous leadership in Germany, and the previous stance of the current 
French Presidency on the issue was very much supportive of Turkish accession to the 
EU as opposed to the longstanding opposition among the public. How one explains this 
question mark is open to discussion. For our purposes, it can be claimed for the German 
case that the constituents of the SPD government in Germany are more supportive of 
Turkey’s membership than the rest and for the French government, it could be claimed 
that the weakening of the position of Chirac led to a change in preferences as such, 
which are both inadequate. Nevertheless, these explanations are beyond the scope of 
this thesis and remains to be explored in future research.   
 
 In sum, the two-level game analysis that has been used to explain EU-Turkey 
relations in this thesis provides a plausible explanation for one to understand the 
hesitancy of EU member states with respect to Turkey’s accession. At Level I, the 
member state governments bargain with respect to their relative powers. At Level II, as 
the government leaders have to take the publics’ preferences into account, there is a 
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mutual interaction between the two elements. Thus, on top of the strong civil-society 
dialogue, the EU government leaders have to make the material benefits of the Turkish 
enlargement visible in order to overcome the high level of public opposition on the 
issue, which will strengthen their positions as well. 
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